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INTRODUCTION

Anyone involved in litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 or similar state statutes 2 may wonder what is entailed
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17a (1982) provides in
relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(I) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
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in proving or disproving discrimination after the United States
Supreme Court's October 1988 Term.3 In fact, in the pending Civil
Rights Act of 1990, Congress is considering reversing some of what
the Supreme Court did during that Term. 4 One of the issues that
the Supreme Court addressed during the 1988 Term involved allocating burdens of proof in two major types of Title VII claims, dis6
parate-treatment and disparate-impact. 5 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
dealt with a disparate-treatment claim, resulted in a plurality opinion, two concurrences and a dissent, and held that the defendant
had the burden of proving that discrimination did not cause an adverse employment decision. 7 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio8 dealt
with a disparate-impact claim, resulted in a five-four decision, and
held that the defendant only had the burden of producing evidence
of, not the burden of proving, a business justification of practices
causing a disparate-impact. 9 In so holding, Wards Cove brought to
disparate-impact cases an allocation of proof that previously had
been limited to early disparate-treatment cases. 10 The problem with
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id.

2. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.12 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. CIVIL RIGrrs LAw § 40-c (McKinney Supp. 1989); see
also Note, The Application of the McDonnell Douglas Analysis to Mixed Motive Employment Discrimination Cases, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 173 (1989) (discussing Minnesota law).
3. See infra notes 210-65 and accompanying text (explaining uncertainty of Supreme
Court's rulings in Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove).

4. See infra notes 346-59 and accompanying text (discussing legislation).
5. See infra notes 145-46 (distinguishing disparate-treatment claims under Title VII,
which are those in which plaintiffs seek to prove that they were intentionally discriminated
against because of their sex, race, religion, color, or national origin, from disparate-impact
claims, which are those in which plaintiffs challenge employer's use of objective or subjective
employment practices that disproportionately exclude from workforce Title VII protected
applicants).
6. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (plurality opinion).
7. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1786, 1787-88 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
9. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). Thejustices disagreed as to whether earlier Supreme Court opinions had required the defendant to prove
not only a business justification but also a business necessity. Compare id. at 2126 (finding
employer has burden of production, but employer need not establish that business necessity
is "indispensable") with id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (countering that employer has
burden of showing that requirements of business necessity are essential). See generally New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979) (holding that employer's refusal to hire persons undergoing methadone did not violate Civil Rights Act of 1964 absent
further statistics on all employees); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-32 (1977) (stating test for prima facie discrimination case and explaining that defendant failed to refute
evidence); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (listing business necessity as
"touchstone" of employee's defense).
10. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26; see, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977) (differentiating between disparate-treatment and disparate-impact).
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the Wards Cove analysis and holding is that disparate-impact cases
are very different from disparate-treatment cases and should not be
analyzed similarly. I The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would restore the
proper burden of proof analysis to disparate-impact cases. 12
Although the United States Supreme Court has been allocating
proof between plaintiffs and defendants in disparate-treatment cases
since 1973,13 the dissent in Price Waterhouse stated that this area of
the law is still "difficult for the bench and bar."' 4 The dissent also
stated that this latest disparate-treatment case is "certain to result in
confusion."1 5 The confusion may grow if disparate-treatment analysis remains applicable to disparate-impact cases.
Allocating proof is not difficult, however, if one understands the
difference between an inference and a presumption. As this Article
will demonstrate, a presumption is a mandatory conclusion drawn
from certain facts. Its purpose is to let the party using it proceed
with litigation. If it is a conclusion drawn from minimal facts, as is
the presumption in the early disparate-treatment cases, it will disappear when the opposing party articulates any evidence to the contrary. Because the presumption is court-created, it does not shift
the burden to the defendant to prove the contrary conclusion, but
only to produce evidence of that conclusion. An inference, on the
other hand, is a conclusion that logically can be drawn from the evidence. 16 If the evidence causes the fact finder to infer and thus believe the conclusion, the opposing party will then have to prove a
defense.
11. See infra notes 322 and accompanying text (examining burden of proof allocation in
disparate impact cases).
12. See infra notes 346-59 and accompanying text (discussing legislative proposal).
13. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. ofGovernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-16
(1983) (holding that when plaintiff in Title VII case proves by preponderance of evidence
prima fade case of employment discrimination, burden shifts to defendant to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252 (1981) (holding that appellate court erred by requiring defendant to prove by preponderance of evidence its non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting or terminating plaintiff);
Board of Trustees of Keane College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978) (per curiam)
(holding that to meet plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, defendant need only "articulate" legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating employee and need not prove
absence of discriminatory motive); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-80
(1978) (holding that plaintiff made prima facie showing of discrimination and defendant
therefore must be allowed to introduce evidence bearing on its motive); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (setting forth basic allocation of burdens and
order of presentation of proof in Title VII cases alleging discriminatory treatment).
14. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1806 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
15. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 55-78 (distinguishing inference from presumption).
For purposes of this Article, the term "inference" refers to a finding of fact based on direct
evidence. When "presumption" is used, it refers to a judicially created or mandated conclusion of law.
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As this Article will continue to demonstrate, the early disparatetreatment cases are presumption cases. Price Waterhouse and all disparate-impact cases, however, are inference cases. They involve the
fact finder concluding from the evidence that forbidden conduct occurred. In Price Waterhouse, the defendant used a discriminatory reason as a motivating factor to make an employment decision. In
disparate-impact cases, the employer uses a neutral employment
practice that causes a disparate-impact on the workforce. Neither of
those types of cases involves a presumption of discrimination drawn
from the minimal evidence that someone applied for ajob, was qualified, was rejected and the job remained open, which is what is involved in early disparate-treatment cases. Those early disparatetreatment cases correctly held that the defendant need only articulate but not prove a nondiscriminatory reason. The former cases
are mixed-motive or disparate-impact cases in which the plaintiff has
already proved plaintiff's case and the burden of proof should then
shift to the defendant to prove a defense. In mixed-motive cases the
defense is causation, that the discriminatory reason did not cause
the adverse employment action. In disparate-impact cases the defense is business necessity, that the employment practice causing the
disparate-impact is necessary to the employer's business.
Part I of this Article outlines the basic principles in allocating burdens of production and persuasion at various stages during litigation, distinguishes the burden of production from the burden of
persuasion, and discusses the substantive significance of this distinction. Part I also examines the differing roles presumptions and inferences should play in allocating the burdens of production and
persuasion. Part II discusses the allocation of burdens of production and persuasion in Title VII cases. Part II-A first explains the
difference between disparate-treatment and disparate-impact cases.
In Part II-B, this Article describes allocation of burdens of production and persuasion in disparate-treatment cases prior to Price
Waterhouse and then discusses and clarifies the disagreements among
the Justices in Price Waterhouse. Part I-B also explains how to distinguish between a presumption and an inference and suggests that if
courts and litigants make this distinction, then they will be able to
distinguish easily between the different types of disparate-treatment
cases. This section demonstrates that a "mixed motive" case such
as Price Waterhouse is not a presumptive case as are McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine, but is an inferential case, and the Price Waterhouse decision is thus correct to shift the burden of proof to the defendant,
although prior inferential disparate-treatment cases shifted only the
burden of production. Part II-C discusses allocations of proof in the
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disparate-impact cases. The section illustrates how Wards Cove erroneously brought presumption principles into disparate-impact cases
and the problems those principles create because the cases contain
no presumptions. Finally, Part II-C recommends legislation to restore basic burden of proof principles to disparate-impact cases.
I.

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN )ALLOCATING BURDENS OF PROOF

Although the Supreme Court has decided a number of Title VII
cases involving allocations of burdens of proof, only one of those
cases refers to basic litigation principles.' 7 Indeed, these cases generally use terms like burden of proof, burden of production, prima
facie case, presumption, and inference, yet only one case defines any
of the terms.' 8 Therefore, this Article defines the terms and sets
forth the legal principles to clarify current caselaw.' 9
A.

Burden of PersuasionDistinguishedfrom Burden of Production

The phrase "burden of proof" is often used.to refer to two concepts, burden of production and burden of persuasion. 2 0 The burden of proof is more frequently used to refer to the latter concept,
which is also referred to as the risk of nonpersuasion. 2 ' As the
names of the terms indicate, a burden of production is merely a burden that requires a party to produce evidence. 2 2 The burden of persuasion requires the party to prove to the fact finder the truth or
existence of those facts for which the party has the burden. 23 To
17. See supra note 13 (listing cases); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254-55 nn.7-10 (1981) (explaining evidentiary principles and definitions including definitions of prima facie, presumption, and inference).
18. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 nn.7-10 (defining terms). See generally Mendez, Presump.
tions ofDiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII DisparateTreatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1129-62
(1980) (discussing ambiguities in Supreme Court's use of litigation terms).
19. See Note, Clearingthe Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to DisparateTreatment Under
Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REV. 863, 893 (1989) (suggesting distinction based on direct or indirect
evidence); see also Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding distinction between direct and indirect evidence "difficult"); see infra text accompanying notes 55-78
(demonstrating that proper distinction is between presumption and inference).
20. F.JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 7.5, at 313-14 (3d ed. 1985); see
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 336, at 947 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCormick]
(discussing definition of "burden of proof"); 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW, §§ 2485, 2487, at 283, 294 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981); see also FED. R. EvID. 301 (distinguishing between burden of going forward or presumption and risk of nonperformance).
21. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.6, at 314; MCCORMICK, supra
note 20, § 336 at 948; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486, at 287.
22. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.7, at 318 (defining burden of
persuasion); McCormick, supra note 20, § 336, at 947 (referring to burden of persuasion as
"risk of nonpersuasion"),J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2485, at 283 (noting that rule evolved
out of conflict between judge and jury and that party must first satisfy judge through burden
of production before matter goes to jury).
23. See F.JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.6, at 316-17 (requiring jury to
find existence of fact more probable than not before holding for party with burden of persua-
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avoid confusion, this Article will not use the ambiguous term of bur-

den of proof and will specifically refer to burdens of production or
persuasion.
B.

Substantive Significance of Allocation of Proof

As litigators know, the allocation of burdens of production and

persuasion can determine the outcome of the case. 24 If the plaintiff
has the burden of production and does not produce evidence, the
plaintiff's suit will be dismissed.2 5 If the defendant has that burden

and does not produce evidence, either the court will enter a verdict
for the plaintiff or the fact finder will be allowed to find in favor of

the plaintiff on that particular issue so that the defendant risks an

26
adverse verdict.

The more stringent burden of persuasion similarly can affect the
outcome of a case. If the evidence in a case is inconclusive, the

party with the burden of persuasion will lose for failure to meet that
burden. 27 This is true regardless of the level of proof required to
meet the burden. 28 Therefore, the party without the burden of

proof will win. Thus, although allocation of the burdens of production and persuasion is nominally procedural, it has significant, sub-

stantive impact. The allocation of the burdens between the parties
can change the outcome of the case.
C. Numerous Factors Govern Allocation of Burden of Proof
Law students are generally taught that the plaintiff must plead
sion); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2485, at 285-86 (noting burden requires party to convince fact-finder of truth).
24. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.7, at 321 (explaining how primary
consequence of rule is procedural and, when no evidence is available, party upon whom burden of production is placed can lose on issue and on entire case); cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (describing responsibilities of party with
burden of production).
25. See 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 293 (noting that judge will not give case
to jury if proponent fails to meet burden of production).
26. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 954-55; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20,
§ 2487, at 298-99 (diagramming burdens on parties).
27. See F.JAMES,JR. & G. HAZARD,JR., supra note 20, § 7.6, at 314; see also 9J. WIGMORE,
supra note 20, § 2485, at 285-86 (using metaphor of general business decision to explain burden of persuasion).
28. In most civil cases, the level of proof is a preponderance of the evidence standard, in
some, a clear and convincing standard. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20,
§ 7.6, at 316 (discussing preponderance of evidence requirement); MCCORMICK, supra note
20, § 338, at 956 (addressing preponderance standard); F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra
note 20, § 7.6, at 317 (detailing clear and convincing evidence standard). Besides allocating
burdens of proof, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1791-93 (1989) (plurality
opinion), also held that the defendant's burden of proof is by the preponderance of the evidence standard, reversing the Court of Appeals which had required a clear and convincing
standard. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1793. This Article does not address the difference in
levels of burdens of proof.
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and prove the elements of plaintiff's prima facie case and that the
defendant must plead and prove affirmative defenses. Thus, to determine the allocation of the burden of persuasion, one would think
that all that is necessary is to determine the elements of plaintiff's
prima facie case. 29 Commentators agree, however, that a formal
rule stating that each party must prove the essential elements of its
case only restates the problem and necessitates another rule to define "essential" elements.3 0 Commentators also agree that a rule
based on whether the elements are pled in the affirmative or negative is not helpful because statements can be phrased either affirmatively or negatively.3 1 Similarly, when a cause of action is statutory
or contractual, some rules for allocating burdens of proof distin32
guish between affirmative language and language of exception.
Because the language may not have been drafted with burden of
persuasion allocation in mind, however, this allocation may produce
arbitrary results.3 3 Indeed, clear and specific legislative guidance as
to burdens of persuasion is rare.3 4 Hence, courts generally allocate
35
the burdens.
The treatise writers agree that no one principle governs how
courts allocate burdens of persuasion and production.3 6 The writers note that courts should consider issues of policy, convenience,
fairness, and probability.3 7 Policy issues include factors such as bur29.

See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 948; F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR.,

supra note 20, § 7.8, at 322-23 (listing common principle as giving burden of persuasion to
party with burden of pleading, although not in all cases); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486,
at 288 (noting that party with affirmative allegation bears burden of production).
30.

F. JAMES,

JR.

& G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.8, at 322; MCCORMICK, supra note

20, § 338, at 949; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486, at 288.
31.

See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.8, at 322; MCCORMICK, supra

note 20, § 337, at 949. For example, negligence, according to James and Hazard, may be
termed "failure to exercise due care," and "[b]reach of a promise may be called nonfulfillment." F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.8, at 322.
32. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 951, 951 n.14. As McCormick illustrates,

insurance contracts are an example. Id. Defendants in indemnity actions may carry the burden of proof on exception clauses, while general coverage burdens fall on plaintiff. Id.
33. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 951 (referring to language as merely formal
choice).
34. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 3.9, at 144-45 (remarking as to
uncommon occurrence of clear statutes).
35. See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text (discussing factors considered in judicial
allocation of burdens).
36. See F.JAMES,JR. & G. HAZARD,JR., supra note 20, § 3.9, at 145 (stating that no universal rule governs burden allocation); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 952 (providing same

proposition); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486, at 288, 291, 292 (giving same proposition);
see also F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 4.4, at 196 (stating that no universal
rule determines what are affirmative defenses); id., § 7.8, at 322 (listing several tests for
allocation).
37. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 952; 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486, at
291 (listing policy and fairness reasons); see also F.JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20,
§ 3.9, at 145 (listing as consideration in allocating burdens primary elements of plaintiff's

case).
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dening the plaintiff because that person seeks to change the status
quo or burdening the defendant when certain defenses are disfavored or unusual.3 8 Included under convenience and fairness issues
are factors such as who has knowledge and access to information
39
and whether the burden follows the natural order of storytelling.
Authorities agree, however, that access to information should not be
overrated as a reason for allocating burdens because fairness may
override an issue of access to information. 40 Moreover, modern discovery rules give both sides greater access to information. 4 1 Finally,
courts may consider the probability of a particular explanation
42
based on common experience in allocating burdens.
As with burdens of persuasion, no uniform rule exists to direct
allocation of burdens of production. 43 Courts use the same factors
that they consider in allocating burdens of persuasion, which ultimately rest on broad policy considerations. 4 4 Although the party
with the burden of persuasion usually has the burden of production, situations arise which necessitate splitting the burdens. 4 5 If the
plaintiff provides evidence sufficient to require the fact finder to rule
for the plaintiff, then the burden of production may shift to the de-

fendant. 4 6 In that case, the defendant may also have the burden of
38. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.8, at 324-25 (noting that when
law disfavors change, it places burden on claimant); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 950
(noting policy disfavoring certain contentions).
39.

See F.JAMES,JR. & G. HAZARD,JR., supranote 20, § 7.8, at 324-25 (describing conven-

ience and fairness issues in burden allocation); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 950
(describing burden following logic of storytelling).
40.

See, e.g., F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.8, at 324 (discussing bal-

ancing of fairness and information access); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486, at 290 (providing same proposition); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 950 (listing instances in which
access to information does not determine burden).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 advisory committee notes (1970) (noting that 1970 Amendments eliminate requirement of good cause pursuant to Rule 34(a) discovery of documents,
and that Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery even if documents are inadmissible at trial); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, 950 n. 11(noting expanded discovery rules have reduced importance of access to information in allocating burdens).
42. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.8, at 324 (addressing courts'
flexibility to allocate burdens according to common experience); MCCORMICK, supra note 20,

§ 337, at 950 (providing same proposition).
43. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2488, at 300. This lack of uniformity is typical also
when parties attempt to allocate burdens of persuasion; see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (detailing lack of consistent allocation method).
44.

MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 952 (examining allocations of burden of pro-

duction); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2488, at 299 (providing same proposition).
45.

See F. JAMES, JR. & G.

HAZARD,

JR., supra note 20, § 4.5; at 196-97 (citing Gomez v.

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (placing burden of production in § 1983 case on defendant for affirmative defense, while plaintiff retained burden of persuasion for case)); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 337, at 951 (stating that usual allocation places both burdens on one
party).
46.

See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.7, at 320 (discussing directed

verdict); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 294 (noting that if proponent introduces
sufficient evidence, judge can require opponent to proffer evidence).

624

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:615

persuasion. 47 In addition, as will be discussed later,48 the court may
use a rebuttable presumption to shift the burden of production or
persuasion from the plaintiff to the defendant. 49 Because a presumption is a procedural device that shifts these burdens, it is created for the same reasons that courts allocate burdens. 50
As no one rule exists, scholars note that allocation of burdens depends on the type of case presented. 5 1 In 1980, the United States
Supreme Court resolved the issue whether an allegation of bad faith
was part of plaintiff's case or whether good faith was an affirmative
defense for the defendant under a section 1983 claim. 52 Holding
that the defendant must plead good faith as an affirmative defense,
the Court based its decision on the language and policies underlying
section 1983, and the parties' access to knowledge. 53 This varied
approach is consistent with the conclusions of the commentators
54
that no one rule governs allocation of burdens.
D. Presumption Distinguishedfrom Inference
Many commentators distinguish the term presumption from the
term inference. 55 Many cases, however, including United States
Supreme Court Title VII cases, use the terms interchangeably; 56
Wigmore notes that the term presumption is often confused and
47. See infra text accompanying notes 128-34 (discussing operation of burden of persuasion after all evidence introduced).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 55-78 (defining and explaining operation of rebuttable presumption).
49. See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 295 (detailing use of presumptions to
shift burden to opponent).
50. Id. (differentiating between presumption as factual inference and as factor that shifts
burden of presumption, and possibly, burden of persuasion); see McCormick, supra note 20,
§ 342, at 965 (explaining operation of presumptions).
51. See 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2486, at 292 (concluding that no one set of principles provides test).
52. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (creating cause
of action to recover damages for infringement of constitutional rights by someone acting
under color of state law).
53. Gomez, 446 U.S. at 638-41 (deciding issue whether defendant was entitled to qualified
immunity defense).
54. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (relating commentators' agreement on lack
of uniform rule).
55. See, e.g., F.JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 342, at 965-66 (distinguishing terms); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 3.2, at 55-56 (2d ed. 1987)

(differentiating between terms); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965-66. But c.f 9 J.
§ 2487, at 295 & n.4 (citing historical confusion between presumption and inference).
WIGMORE, supra note 20,

56.

Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1801 (1989) (stating "an

inference arises") with id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (remarking "that fact finder is
entitled to presume"); compare Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981) (explaining that plaintiff must plead factors that give rise to "inference") with id. at
254 n.7 (distinguishing between presumption and inference and stating that "presumption" is
being applied).
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must be distinguished from an inference. 5 7
A presumption or a presumptive inference is a court-made device
that says that if a party can prove certain explicitly delineated facts,
the court will conclude that an additional fact exists.58 Thus, a presumption is a legally mandated conclusion which follows from certain specific facts. 59 For example, if A is proved then B is presumed
to be true. Once B is presumed to be true, and if the presumption is
rebuttable, the opposing party must now produce evidence that B is
not true, even though the party who produced evidence of A produced no evidence of B. 60 A presumption, therefore, is a procedural
device that shifts the burden of production, and sometimes even
persuasion, from the party normally having these burdens. 6 1
Because a rebuttable presumption is a procedural device to shift
the burden of production or persuasion and because many factors
go into allocating these burdens, if a presumption can be used in a
particular kind of case, a court can draw the presumptive conclusion
even though the predicate facts, standing alone, could logically result in a number of different conclusions. 6 2 For example, the presumption that the Supreme Court created in Title VII disparate57. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 295. Unfortunately, Wigmore uses the term
inference in the definition of presumption. A presumption, he says, is a rule of law by which a
judge draws an inference of a specific fact from specific evidence. Id. Wigmore distinguishes
a presumption from a "mass of evidence ... made up of a variety of complicated data, differing in every new trial and not to be tested by any set formula." Id. Thus, he is really distinguishing inferences that are drawn as the result of legal presumptions from inferences that are
findings of fact based on evidence. The two meanings of the word inference have differing
procedural effects; therefore, they should not be confused. See infra text accompanying notes
112-27, 135-44 (discussing how presumption usually shifts only burden of production but
inference can shift burden of persuasion).
58. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965 (explaining operation of presumption
and distinguishing it from factual inference); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2490, at 302-03
(defining presumption as having effect of rule of law).
59. Wigmore gives the example of presuming death from a seven-year absence. 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2490, at 303; see G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56, 58 (describing
mandatory inference, distinguishing it from factual inference by its compulsory effect, and
listing examples).
60. A presumption that can be rebutted by the opposing party is a rebuttable presumption. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (discussing rebuttable presumption). By contrast, an irrebuttable, or conclusive, presumption cannot be rebutted and is therefore not a
procedural device, but a substantive rule of law. G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 57; McCoRMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 981. For example, a child under seven is irrebuttably presumed
incapable of committing a felony. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 966. The presumptions referred to in this Article are rebuttable presumptions.
61. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 981 (discussing shift of burden of production); id. at §§ 342, 344 at 965, 981 (addressing argument that shift of burden of production is
at minimum); see also G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at 59-60 (stating burden of persuasion
shifts under minority view); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 981 (providing same proposition); infra note 64 (discussing majority and minority views).
62. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 55 (defining presumptive conclusion as whether
basic facts support finding); see also id. § 3.2, at 56 (defining presumptive conclusion as "strong
likelihood of existence of presumed conclusion"); see also FED. R. EvID. 301 (instructing as to
evidence of presumption).
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treatment cases is that the conclusion of intentional discrimination
can be presumed from four facts; that the plaintiff was protected by
Title VII, applied and was qualified for the job, was rejected, and
the job remained open. 6 3 Obviously, other conclusions for why the
plaintiff was rejected could be drawn from these facts.
Whether a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion or the
burden of production depends on the jurisdiction and the case. 6 4 If
the policy reasons for creating the presumption are strong and/or
the basic facts underlying the presumption are probative of its conclusion, then the presumption might shift the burden of persuasion
as well as the burden of production to the opposing party.6 5 Usually, however, the presumption shifts only the burden of
66
production.
If the presumption shifts only the burden of production to the
defendant, and if the defendant produces no evidence, then the
plaintiff wins on that issue. 6 7 If the defendant does produce admissible evidence, then the presumption will disappear; this disappearance is sometimes referred to as a "bursting bubble
presumption. ' 6 8 The plaintiff will then be left with the burden of
persuasion, which had never shifted, and logical inferences, if any,
left from facts used to create the presumption. 69 If the facts used to
create the presumption are insufficient on their own to rebut the
evidence that the defendant produced, then the plaintiff must either
disprove the defendant's evidence or produce more evidence.
63. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
64. There is a debate as to whether all presumptions should function in the same manner
and if so, how. The debate is sometimes referred to by the names of the proponents of different theories. Thayer views all presumptions as "bursting bubbles," disappearing when the
defendant produces evidence and then shifting only the burden of production. MCCORMICK,
supra note 20, § 344, at 974-75. Morgan views presumptions as shifting the burden of persuasion. G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at 59-60. Federal Rule of Evidence 301 takes the Thayer
approach. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 981; see also G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at
59-65 (discussing majority view that only burden of production shifts, not both burdens).
Several states, however, have adopted the minority view that both burdens shift. See ME. R.
EVID. § 301 (West 1989); Wisc. STAT. § 903.01 (1987); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 603-06 (West
1960 & Supp. 1990).
65. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 981-82 (commenting on potentially increased need to preserve presumption based upon social policy).
66. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965 (describing presumption as rule that at
least shifts burden of production); see also FED. R. EvID. 301 (establishing burdens for federal
courts).
67. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 973-74 (noting that jury will rule for plaintiff
ifjury finds that presumed facts exist).
68. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 974-75 (referring to Thayer's "bursting
bubble" presumption theory).
69. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 974 (citing Thayer theory); 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 20, § 2489, at 300 (presuming that burden of persuasion was originally on plaintiff); G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at 65 (differentiating between presumption and inference);
see also 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2491, at 304 (providing same proposition).
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Without the presumption, plaintiff's evidence is no longer sufficient
to survive a motion for a directed verdict. 70 By contrast, if the presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant, the defendant must not only produce evidence contrary to plaintiff's
evidence, but also convince the fact finder of the persuasiveness of
71
that evidence.
A factual inference differs from a presumption or presumptive inference in that it is a conclusion that can be drawn logically from the
evidence and could be the most likely conclusion to draw from the
facts. 72 In the course of a trial, the fact finder may or may not believe the inferences. Thus, factual inferences are not compulsory
conclusions. 73 Factual inferences can result in the fulfillment of a
party's burden of persuasion. They do not, however, establish what
constitutes that burden. If the fact finder believes that the inferred
facts exist 74 and the court believes these facts are sufficient to meet
the party's burden of persuasion, then the burden of persuasion is
fulfilled. At that point, the inference shifts the burden of persuasion
75
to the opposing party to prove an affirmative defense.
Thus, courts create a presumption or presumptive inference from
a specific fact pattern while a fact finder concludes a factual inference from facts specific to a party's case, which that party persuasively marshalls to convince the fact finder. A presumption exists
absolutely, at least temporarily, because a court says it exists, but the
70. See infra notes 80-134 and accompanying text (discussing use of presumption in context of trial).
71. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 336, at 947 (defining and distinguishing burdens of
production and persuasion); 9J. Wigmore, supra note 20, § 2489, at 301 (addressing burden
of persuasion).
72. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56-57 (distinguishing presumption from inference); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965 (defining rational inference as use of ordinary
reasoning to determine one fact from prior fact). Black's Law Dictionary defines an inference
as:
In the law of evidence, a truth or proposition drawn from another which is supposed
or admitted to be true. A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought
to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of
facts, already proved or admitted ....
Inferences are deductions or conclusions
which with reason and common sense lead the jury to draw from facts which have
been established by the evidence in the case.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (5th ed. 1979).
73. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (distinguishing factual inferences from
mandatory or compulsory presumptions).
74. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.3, at 56-57 (stating that question of weight is forjury);
9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2491, at 304 (noting that weight of inferences is question for
jury).
75. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (describing affirmative defense). These
decisions are not made one at a time. If the case is ajury case, the court will instruct the jury
as to what to do if they believe certain evidence. For example, they will then need to consider
a defendant's evidence. In a bench trial, the court will make these decisions as it determines
what evidence is most credible.
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mere introduction of evidence can cause the presumption to disappear. 7 6 On the other hand, a factual inference is a conclusion that
will not disappear although it is a conclusion that a fact finder might
find more or less likely depending on the strength of the underlying
facts and the other evidence. 7" A presumption will usually shift only
the burden of production. 78 An inference, if it is believed and if it
fulfills the plaintiff's burden of persuasion, will shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant.
E. Burdens of Production and PersuasionApplied
During Stages of Litigation
Presumptions, inferences, and burdens of production and persuasion have different roles at different stages of the litigation. 79 To
understand the allocation of proof, one must understand these
stages.
1.

Complaint and motion to dismiss

A case is begun when the plaintiff files a complaint.8 0 The plaintiff generally has the burden of pleading what is sometimes referred
to as a prima facie case 8 l with respect to plaintiff's claim.8 2 That is,
plaintiff's complaint must state enough to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.8 3 One method a court can use to
determine that a plaintiff has pleaded enough to state a claim is to
76. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (relating effect of evidence or presumption); 9
J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2491, at 305 (expanding upon existence of presumptions).
77. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (addressing question of existence of inferred
facts); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2491, at 304 (leaving for jury to determine strength of
evidence).
78. See supra notes 61 & 64 and accompanying text (stating rebuttable presumption usually transfers only burden of production).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 80-127 (discussing various stages of litigation).
80. FED. R. Crv. P. 3.
81. The term prima facie case can be confusing because it can refer to what plaintiff must
plead to survive a motion to dismiss, what evidence plaintiff must produce to survive a directed verdict, or what evidence plaintiff must prove to win. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20,
§ 342, at 965; id.at 955 n.4 (explaining dual usage of term "prima facie"). Wigmore also
states that prima facie has a dual definition. It can be equivalent to a presumption or it can
mean producing enough evidence to go to the jury. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2494, at
378-80; see BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 1071 (defining prima facie as evidence
sufficient to overcome motion to dismiss).
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that the
complaint should contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief" to avoid problems involving whether a plaintiff has to distinguish between
facts and conclusions of law. Id.; see F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 3.11, at
151 (discussing complaint under federal rules). A complaint must also state the jurisdictional
basis and the request for relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) and (3).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (describing motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); see
F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 3.9, at 143 (requiring plaintiff to make showing sufficient to press action forward).
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give the plaintiff the benefit of a presumption.8 4 For example, if a
plaintiff pleads sufficient qualification for a job and the plaintiff's
application is rejected although the job stayed open, a court could
presume intentional discrimination.8 5 A court determines whether
plaintiff has pleaded a prima facie case or is entitled to a presumption based on the same factors that determine the allocation of burden of production and persuasion. 6 Those factors are case specific
87
and involve issues of policy and convenience.
2.

Discovery

If the plaintiff's complaint can survive a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff, as well as the defendant, can proceed to discovery. 88 The
plaintiff may need discovery to obtain proof of what the plaintiff believes in good faith he or she has pleaded.8 9 If the complaint is dismissed, plaintiff cannot discover these facts. Thus, one purpose of a
presumption at the pleading stage is to allow a plaintiff to proceed
to discovery by stating a prima facie case from a set of facts likely to
be known to the plaintiff.90
3. Answer and affirmative defenses
If the plaintiff's complaint can survive a motion to dismiss, the
defendant will file an answer. 9 1 To dispute the plaintiff's claim, the
defendant may deny the plaintiff's facts 92 or raise affirmative defenses. 93 An affirmative defense is a set of facts which, if believed,
will defeat the plaintiff's recovery. 9 4 Generally, if an issue is labeled
as an affirmative defense, then the procedural consequence is that
the defendant has the burdens of production and persuasion on that
issue. 9 5 The same factors that determine the allocation of burden of
84. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 55-57 (describing presumptions); MCCORMICK,
supra note 20, § 343, at 968-69 (discussing reasons for allocating presumptions).
85. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
86. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 3.9, at 148; see id. § 7.8, at 323 (explaining that factors used to allocate burden of pleading are same as used to allocate burden
of proof).
87. See supra notes 30-54 and accompanying text (discussing factors).
88. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 3.11, at 153.
89. See id. (calling plaintiff's discovery "fishing expedition").
90. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965 (describing effect of presumption on
prima facie case).

91.

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (providing criteria for answer).

92.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (providing for denials).

93. See FED. R. CiV. P. 8(c) (providing for affirmative defenses). The defendant will also
admit facts and identify those of which he or she has no knowledge. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
94. See F.JAMES,JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 4.5, at 195-98 (discussing affirmative defenses; explaining that affirmative defense is not denial but positive fact that lessens
plaintiff's claim, compelling fact finder to balance competing claims).
95. Id.
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proof determine the allocation of facts between plaintiff's prima fa96
cie case and defendant's affirmative defense.
4.

Motion for summaiy judgment, plaintif's evidence, and motion for a
directed verdict

Assuming material facts in dispute preclude summary judgment,
the case will proceed to trial for a fact finder to determine the facts
and for a judge to apply the law. 9 7 At this stage plaintiff must pro-

duce evidence of plaintiff's prima facie case. 98 The plaintiff's evidence must be sufficient to survive the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case. 99
One way that the plaintiff can survive a motion for a directed verdict is to produce evidence which, if believed, would allow or compel a verdict for the plaintiff, unless the defendant has an affirmative
defense. 00 In some cases, as with a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
can survive a motion for a directed verdict by producing evidence
that leads to a legally mandated presumption. 10 ' Again, the same
factors which govern the allocation of proof determine what evidence the plaintiff must produce. 0 2
5. Defendant's evidence and plaintiff s response

If a plaintiff survives a motion for a directed verdict, the defend96. See F.JAMES,JR. & G. HAZARD,JR., supra note 20, § 3.14, at 163; see also supra notes 3054 and accompanying text (discussing factors that determine allocation of burden of
persuasion).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. A motion for summary judgment, arising after discovery, is
granted when no material issues in dispute exist, and one party is entitled to a ruling as a
matter of law. See Wilson v. Myers, 823 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Ozark Air Lines, Inc.
v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 487, 489 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aft'd, 744 F.2d 1347
(8th Cir. 1984). In this instance, the judge will rule for one party, if, given tile facts as true
and construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant, any disputed issues of fact
remain. See Hill v. Linahan, 697 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Ramirez v. Burr,
607 F. Supp. 170, 173 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (finding of unlikelihood that movant will prevail at
trial is not adequate reason for summary judgment motion). See generally F. JAMES, JR. & G.
HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 5.19, at 271-77 (discussing summary judgment).
98. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing prima facie case).
99. See F.JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.7, at 319 (discussing plaintiff's
evidence). Making out a prima facie case at this stage is also used to refer to shifting the
burden of production. The two uses of prima facie cases create confusion. See McCoRMICK,
supra note 20, § 342, at 965 n.4 (noting ambiguity); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2494, at
378-82 (discussing dual meanings of prima facie).
100. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965; see also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (concerning affirmative defenses).
101. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965 (explaining effect of presumptions); id.
§ 344, at 973 (describing presumption as protection against directed verdict); see also supra
notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing motion to dismiss).
102. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 20, § 7.7, at 318-19 (noting parallel
factors); see supra notes 29-54 and accompanying text (discussing factors considered in shifting
burden of proof).
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ant will put on his or her evidence.10 3 The plaintiff may have survived the motion because of the strength of plaintiff's evidence or
10 4
because of a presumption in plaintiff's favor.
If the plaintiff survives the motion for directed verdict through the
use of a presumption, the underlying facts without the presumptive,
mandated conclusion may be inconclusive. For example, the fact
that one applies for a job, is qualified and rejected and is protected
by Title VII is not conclusive evidence of intentional discrimination
by the employer.1 0 5 The presumptive facts could also have independent probative value. For example, from evidence that a letter is correctly mailed in due course of business, a fact finder could
either presume or infer that the letter was received.10 6 When a
plaintiff survives a motion for a directed verdict with this kind of
presumption, it is similar to surviving the motion because of the
strength of the evidence. 10 7 Defendant's evidence has different consequences for the plaintiff depending upon whether the plaintiff's
case is based on a presumption with inconclusive facts or based on
the strength of the evidence.' 0 8 If the underlying facts are not probative of the presumptive conclusion, defendant's evidence will create another burden of production for the plaintiff.10 9 If the
underlying facts are independently probative, they might shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant.' 1 0
a.

Rebutting a presumption based on inconclusivefacts- "bursting
the bubble"

According to the majority view of presumptions,' 1 ' plaintiff's
proffered facts, though forming a presumption, may be insufficient
for the court to logically infer a conclusion following introduction of
103. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARDS, JR., supra note 20, § 7.7, at 319 (describing that in
general case opponent will then put on evidence); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965
(explaining process between parties for directed verdict).
104. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 342, at 965 (describing prima fade case and use of
presumption).
105. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
106. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at 65 (describing how effect of presumption remains though presumption technically disappears).
107. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 298 (diagramming proceeding at trial).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10 (describing differing burdens).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 112-27 (explaining effect of defendant's evidence
on plaintiff's burdens).
110. See infra notes 111-27 and accompanying text (explaining how strength of plaintiff's
evidence, if believed, can shift burden of persuasion to defendant to prove affirmative
defense).
111. See supra note 64 (explaining majority and minority views of effect of presumptions
on burden of production and persuasion).
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defendant's rebuttal evidence. 1 2 For example, as mentioned previously, under Title VII proof of an individual applying for a job, being qualified and rejected, and the job remaining open is not
conclusive of an employer's intentional discrimination if the employer then introduces evidence of a legitimate reason for rejecting
the applicant. 133 In that instance, upon the defendant's motion, the
court may enter a directed verdict against the plaintiff if the plaintiff
fails to produce any additional evidence." 1 4 To avoid this, the plaintiff would need to proffer additional evidence in the form of either
cross-examination or rebuttal evidence to discredit the defendant's
evidence. 1" 5 Indeed, without further evidence, the plaintiff cannot
prove his or her case and is thus unable to shift the burden of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant." t6 Specifically, the plaintiff has only established a prima facie case because of judicial
permission in the form of a presumption, not because of the evidence with respect to the defendant's wrongdoing." 7 The premise
underlying the presumption is that absent an explanation from the
defendant, the presumptive conclusion is a likely conclusion. 1I8
Consequently, defendant's rebuttal evidence of plaintiff's predicate
facts would "burst" the premise upon which the presumption was
based by providing a reason for the prior absence of an explanation. 119 Thus, a rebuttable presumption without independently probative underlying facts will shift only the burden of production to
the defendant. 20 The plaintiff will win only if the defendant is silent. 12 ' Otherwise, because plaintiff retains the burden of proof, if
rebuttal evidence is introduced, plaintiff will need to produce more
evidence or disprove defendant's evidence to reestablish the prima
22
facie case.'
112. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 975-76 (discussing effect of defendant's evidence on plaintiff's presumption).
113. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
114. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 975 (assuming that legislature or court, as
matter of policy has not shifted burden of proof to defendant despite inconclusiveness of
underlying facts).
115. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (describing shifts in burden of production); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 299 (noting shifting burden on plaintiff).
116. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 299.
117. See id. at 295 (explaining presumption).
118. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 955 (discussing effect of silence).
119. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at 59 (discussing Thayer or majority view); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 975 (explaining "bursting bubble" theory).
120. See 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 298 (diagramming process).
121. See G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (stating that trier must accept presumed fact
unless rebutted by contravening evidence); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 955 (comparing silence of different points of litigation).
122. See 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 298-99 (diagramming process of shifting
burdens and placement of directed verdicts).
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According to the minority view, a presumption should shift both
the burdens of production and persuasion to the defendant. The
primary reason given for this view is that the policies underlying the
123
cause of action favor less stringent burdens on the plaintiff.
b.

Counteractingan inferentialfinding offact in favor of the plaintiff

If the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict did not survive as
the result of a presumption based on inconclusive facts, then the
evidence on its own, after the presumption bursts or without ever
having triggered a presumption, may cause a fact finder to find that
the plaintiff has met his or her burden of persuasion. 124 The fact
finder would have both the plaintiff's evidence and the defendant's
evidence and the plaintiff would have the burden of persuasion.
This burden could be met if the fact finder finds credible direct evidence of defendant's liability or logically infers defendant's liability
from persuasive circumstantial evidence 1 25 and disbelieves the evidence defendant presented to deny plaintiff's evidence.' 26 If the
fact finder believed the plaintiff's inferences despite the defendant's
evidence, then the defendant would have the burden of proving affirmative defenses.1 2 7 Thus, the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff's case would have been met on the basis of the evidence
presented and any believed inferences therefrom, not on the basis
of the presumption. The burden of proof would then shift to the
defendant to prove affirmative defenses.
6.

Factfinding

After both sides rest, the fact finder will weigh the evidence, and
28
only at this point will the court apply the burdens of persuasion.'
Thus, only at this point will it become apparent whether the defendant has any burden of persuasion.' 29 First, the fact finder would
need to determine that the plaintiff's evidence satisfied the plaintiff's burden of persuasion.' 3 0 If it did, then the fact finder would
123. See supra note 64 (explaining minority view).
124. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 955 (explaining that plaintiff could win directed verdict on strength of evidence).
125. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 952-54 (discussing use of direct and circumstantial evidence and noting that more than "a scintilla" of evidence needed to convince fact
finder).
126. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 298 (diagramming process by which defendant must shift burden of production back to plaintiff or risk losing on weight of evidence).
127. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative defenses).
128. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 336, at 947 (stating that burdens of persuasion are
important only after all evidence is introduced).
129. See 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2488, at 298-99 (diagramming process and noting
areas for jury determination and point at which jury receives instructions).
130. See id (explaining process by which evidence shifts burdens and that, after both sides
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consider whether the defendant had met the burden of proving affirmative defenses.' 3 ' At this stage, if the fact finder believed the
plaintiff's evidence and not the defendant's, then the plaintiff would
win. 13 2 If not, -then the defendant would win. 13 3 If a doubt remained, then the party without the burden of persuasion would
win. 14
F.

Significance of Presumption and Inference on Burdens of Proof

The difference between an inference and a presumption, or a presumptive inference and a factual inference, is significant in allocating burdens of proof. A presumption will not shift the burden of
persuasion unless it does so for policy reasons or because it is exceedingly probative.' 3 5 Generally, it will shift only the burden of
production, but the burden of persuasion will remain with the
3 6
plaintiff.1
When plaintiff establishes an inference based on the evidence to
the satisfaction of the fact finder, then the burden of persuasion will
shift to the defendant if, with the inference, the plaintiff has proved
that which is allocated to the plaintiff's burden.. 3 7 The burden
shifting result of an inference is different from that of a presumption
because an inference is a conclusion that the fact finder determines
from the evidence. 13 8 The defendant's evidence will not burst or
destroy the inference but is weighed against the inference to ascerhave avoided directed verdict, burden of persuasion remains on plaintiff and is for jury to
decide).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 91-96 (discussing affirmative defenses).
132. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2488, at 299 (explaining plaintiff's responsibility to
produce evidence that will satisfy fact finder and cause plaintiff to prevail).
133. Id (stating that opponent will prevail if plaintiff fails to come forward with adequate
evidence).
134. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing significance of burden of
proof). See generally F.JAMEs,JR. AND G. HAZARD,JR., supra note 20, § 7.6, at 314-16 (discussing importance of burden allocation); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 954-55 (defining
and discussing burdens).
135. See supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text (defining presumption and burden of
proof); G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (discussing shift of burden of production); see also
MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 344, at 973-74 (defining presumption).
136. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text (explaining that rebuttable presumptions concerning probative underlying facts shifts burden of production, not burden of
proof); 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 295-99 (explaining and diagramming process
of burden shifting).
137. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (defining inference and discussing shifting of burden); G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (discussing import and treatment of
references).
138. See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text (describing differences between inference and presumption);J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 295-99 (defining presumption
and distinguishing from inference); see also G. LILLY, supra note 55, § 3.4, at 59-60 (discussing
shifts of burdens under minority and majority views).
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tain which is more credible.13 9 The stronger the underlying facts

and circumstantial evidence, the stronger the inference.1 40 Thus, an
inference produces evidence for the fact finder to choose to believe,
not a judicially created conclusion.
The early Title VII disparate-treatment allocation of proof cases
are presumptive inference cases, 14 1 while the later ones and all of
the disparate-impact cases are factual inference cases.' 42 Thus, the
former cases should involve shifting only the burden of production,
and the latter cases should involve shifting the burden of persuasion. One recent case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 143 a disparatetreatment inferential case, did shift the burden correctly, whereas
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 144 a disparate-impact case, did not.
II.

BURDEN OF PRODUCTION AND PROOF ALLOCATION
IN TITLE VII CASES

A.

Disparate-TreatmentCases Distinguishedfrom Disparate-ImpactCases

Disparate-treatment cases under Title VII are those in which
plaintiffs seek to prove that they were intentionally discriminated
against (treated disparately) because of their sex, race, religion,
color, or national origin. 14 5 These cases differ from those labeled as

disparate-impact cases. Disparate-impact cases involve challenges
to the use of objective or subjective employment practices that
disproportionately cause the exclusion from the employer's work
force of applicants, or likely applicants, protected by Title VII.146
139. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text (discussing differing effects of evidence on inference); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338, at 952-54 (describing burden shifting
and evidence needed to prevail); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2487, at 248 (diagramming
process of burden shifting).
140. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text (discussing effect of facts on outcome);
9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2488, at 298-99 (explaining effect of facts on burden shifting
and jury determination).
141. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)
(resolving Title VII dispute through use of prima facie case presumption); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (using presumption to prove whether discrimination was "more likely than not" to have occurred); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (using, but not defining, presumptive inferences); see also infra notes 15987 and accompanying text (characterizing early cases as presumptive inference cases).
142. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1791 (1989) (affirming trial court's
finding that plaintiff's inferences drawn from stereotyping proved discrimination); see also infra
notes 274-77 and accompanying text (discussing different burden between early and later
cases).
143. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
144. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
145. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17a (1983); see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977) (distinguishing use of disparate-treatment model from disparateimpact model).
146. Id.; see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784-87 (1988) (discussing application of disparate-impact theory to subjective employment practices). To prevail in
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Allocation of Proofin Disparate-Treatment Cases

Disparate-treatmentcases prior to 1989
a.

The holdings

Courts in disparate-treatment cases have always required that the
plaintiff prove that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination. 14 7 The mechanics of proving discrimination have been the
subject of much litigation. 148 In 1973, the United States Supreme
Court first addressed proof requirements in a disparate-treatment
case. 149 In McDonnell Douglas, a unanimous Court held that to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must show membership in a racial minority, application and qualification for a job,
rejection, and continuing availability of thejob. 150 The Court noted
that those four showings may vary.'-5 For example, the plaintiff
could be a woman challenging a failure to promote, rather than to
hire, as was the case in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
52
Burdine.1
The Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas failed to clarify whether
the defendant had to articulate or prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action and thus failed to
clarify how the burdens of production and persuasion were to be
a disparate-impact case, plaintiffs need not show intentional discrimination. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1987).
147. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The
plaintiff's initial burden is to prove a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 253. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the decision. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)). The plaintiff, however, always bears the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated" against plaintiff. Id.
148. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting decisions in circuit courts).
149. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff alleged that
he was denied employment because of his involvement in civil rights activities and because of
his race and color. The defendant employer denied that race was a consideration and instead
argued that plaintiff's involvement in criminal conduct was its reason for not rehiring the
plaintiff.
150. Id. at 802.
151. Id. at 802 n.13; see Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978) (stating
that McDonnell Douglas formulation of prima facie claim not intended to be inflexible rule);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (observing that
McDonnell Douglas decision's importance is not in specifying discrete elements of proof required, but in recognition of general principle that plaintiff has initial burden of providing
evidence sufficient to create inference of discrimination).
152. 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.6 (1981) (resulting in lack of serious contention that Burdine
failed to prove a prima facie case). As an employee in the Public Service Careers (PSC) Division, Burdine applied for the Project Director position when her supervisor resigned, Her
application was rejected but she was assigned additional duties. The position remained vacant for six months, at which time a male from another division was hired as Project Director,
Burdine and two other employees were fired, and a second male hired as the only other professional employee in the PSC Division.
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allocated.15 3 Lower courts were confused regarding whether the
burden of production or persuasion shifted to the defendant after
plaintiff established a prima facie case.' 54 Unfortunately, a subsequent Supreme Court decision used the words "articulate" and
"prove" interchangeably, leading to more litigation. 155 The Burdine
decision clarified this issue, holding that after the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case with the four McDonnell Douglas factors,
the defendant must articulate, but need not prove, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.' 5 6 If the
defendant articulates a reason, then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff
must prove that the employer's stated reason is a pretext to hide
intentional discrimination.' 5 7 In the context of this four step prima
facie case, the Court in Burdine held that the burden of persuasion
remains with the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination. 158
b.

The McDonnell Douglas and Burdine-type cases are presumption
cases

Although the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine type cases use the
terms presumption and inference interchangeably, 159 those cases
are in fact presumptive cases. As described above, the conclusion of
those cases, that only the burden of production shifts to the defend153. Oddly enough, although the Court in McDonnell Douglas noted that the "critical issue" involved the "allocation of proof," McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800, and noted that the
opinions of the lower courts "attempted with a notable lack of harmony, to state the applicable rules," id. at 801, the Court did not cite authorities on allocation of proof. Id. at 802-03.
Nor did the Court define what it meant by prima facie case or set forth any applicable rules.
Id. Instead, the Court in McDonnell Douglas first spoke of plaintiff's "initial burden" and the
defendant's burden then "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection," id. at 802, but later spoke of the defendant as having discharged its "burden of
proof." Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
154. See Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that under
McDonnell Douglas onus is on employer to establish events justifying employment action);
Harper v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that McDonnell
Douglas standard shifts burden to defendant to present acceptable, legitimate business reasons
for discriminatory practice after plaintiff establishes prima facie case).
155. Compare Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that employer's burden lies in "proving" decision based on legitimate consideration) with id. at 578
(stating that employer need only "articulate" legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for decision). See generally Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (holding
that employer need only provide nondiscriminatory reason for action, not show nondiscriminatory intent).
156. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
157. Id. at 256.
158. Id. at 253 (citing 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2489 (Chadbourne rev. 1981)). The citation from WIGMORE is from a section on bursting presumptions.
See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2489 (stating burden of persuasion never shifts); see also
supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text (explaining bursting presumptions); G. LILLY, supra
note 55, § 3.2, at 56 (discussing distinction between presumption and inference).
159. See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text (discussing two cases).
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ant, is consistent with basic litigation principles. 16 0 The four facts
that the cases hold establish a prima facie case-that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected group, was qualified for and applied for a
job, was rejected, and the position remained open or could have
been filled by the plaintiff- 6'without more, are not sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could logically infer discrimination.
The presumption is not sufficient, therefore, to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant because, even if the plaintiff can prove
these four pleaded facts, the plaintiff will not have proved intentional discrimination. 162 Rather, the defendant's burden becomes
one of articulating, but not proving, an explanation of the adverse
employment action.' 6 3 This explanation will burst the presumption
because it is no more than a court-created conclusion.' 64 With the
presumption gone, the plaintiff retains the initial burden of persuasion and must still prove intentional discrimination, which will entail
proving that the defendant's articulated reason was a pretext to hide
intentional discrimination. 1 65
Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters 16 6 attempted to explain
why only the burden of production shifted, but confused the explanation by using the terms "presumption" and "inference" interchangeably. Furnco distinguished the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
showing from an ultimate finding of fact concerning the discriminatory refusal to hire. 167 The Court stated that the former raises an
160. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text (discussing basic principles in allocating
burdens of proof.
161. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
162. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. As discussed previously in the text, establishing a prima
facie case occurs at three different stages in litigation with differing allocations of burdens. It
can refer to sufficient pleading to survive a motion to dismiss, sufficient evidence produced to
survive a motion for directed verdict, or sufficient evidence proved to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. See supra notes 80-93, 97-102 and accompanying text. Generally, when plaintiff pleads and produces evidence of the prima facie case, only the burden of
pleading and production, not persuasion, is shifted to defendant. If the plaintiff proves the
prima facie case, however, typically the burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant. See
supra notes 80-110. Although McDonnell Douglas stated that the plaintiff "proved a prima facie
case," McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added), the procedural posture of the
case involved the court of appeals' reversal of the district court's dismissal of the Title VII
703(a)(1) claim. Id. at 797. Presumably, therefore, the Court was referring to a pleaded, not
proven, prima facie case. A pleaded prima facie case would not shift the burden ofpersuasion
to the defendant. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56.
163. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
164. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text (discussing "bursting bubble" theory
of discrimination).
165. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that plaintiff meets burden directly by persuading
court discriminatory reason more likely to have motivated employer or indirectly by showing
employer's explanation is not credible).
166. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
167. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Furnco allowed its job
superintendent to hire bricklayers he knew to be experienced and did not require him to hire
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inference of discrimination only because it presumes the acts, if not
otherwise explained, are more likely than not based on impermissible factors.1 68 The Court presumed intentional discrimination, not
because the plaintiff pleaded evidence negating the employer's legitimate reasons for an adverse employment action, and not because
the presumption was the most probable conclusion, but because the
Court shifted the burden of production to the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason.1 69 Thus, the Court presumed from minimal
facts that the plaintiff pleaded intentional discrimination.170 The
Court did not factually infer intentional discrimination based on
71
plaintiff's pleadings alone.'
Burdine was the first of the cases resolving Title VII burden of
proof issues to cite evidence treatises or define what was meant by
prima facie case. 17 2 Burdine noted that a prima facie case may describe either the plaintiff's establishment of a "legally mandatory
rebuttable presumption" or may describe "plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at
issue" and noted that it was using the former meaning. 73 Thus, the
Court noted that the four facts that the plaintiff must plead and produce create a presumption, not an inference of "the fact at issue,"
which is intentional discrimination. 1 74 Unfortunately, despite distinguishing an inference from a presumption in its definition of
prima facie case and saying that it was referring to a presumption,
the Court described the McDonnell Douglas factors as giving rise to an
inference. 17 5 The Court then returned to presumption language,
saying, "[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated . . ." and
noted that if the employer is silent, then the plaintiff must win. 176
None of the cases explained why the four factors listed establish
at the jobsite. Id. at 570. The district court found that 13.3% of the man-days were worked
by blacks and that of the bricklayers Furnco hired, 20% were black. Id. at 570, 572 n.2.
168. Id. at 567.

169. Id. at 577-78.
170.

Id. at 575-76.

171.

Id.

172. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); see also supra
note 153 (noting Court's failure in prior cases to provide support or definitions for its
terminology).
173. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7. The Court did not mention that a prima facie case can
also involve proving evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proving affirmative defenses to
the defendant. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (explaining effect of evidence in

prima facie case on defendant's burden).
174. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; see supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text (explaining
difference between presumption and inference).
175. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 n.7.
176. Id. at 254.
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the plaintiff's initial prima facie case. 17 7 Because they are minimal
factors from which the Court will initially presume discrimination, it
appears that sub silentio the Court is creating a presumption for the
policy reasons of allowing the plaintiff to have access to discovery,' 7 8 and not requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence negating
all possible legitimate reasons for adverse employment action. 17 9
Creation of the presumption in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, therefore, is a policy decision pronouncing that to require the plaintiff to
plead more or to produce great quantities of evidence would unduly
inhibit enforcement of Title VII. 8 0 Unfortunately, the disparatetreatment cases do not explain their allocation of proof in terms of
statutory policy needs.' 8 ' Burdine recognized that the plaintiff had a
light burden in establishing a prima facie case of disparate-treatment, but did not explain the reasoning.' 8 2 Creating burdens of
production and presumptions for policy and convenience reasons,
however, is consistent with general litigation principles. 8 3 Courts
and litigants might find the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine formulas
less confusing if the rationales for them were more explicitly articu84
lated and the terms used to describe them more clearly defined.
Neither McDonnell Douglas nor Burdine involved cases in which the
fact finder found that the plaintiff proved as a matter of fact, not
presumption, that the defendant had intentionally discriminated or
proved that the defendant's justification of the adverse employment

action was a pretext to hide intentional discrimination. 8 5 As illus177. Id. at 253-54 (discussing McDonnell Douglas four part test at length); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (failing to explain why four selected factors were chosen despite characterizing standard as flexible).
178. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons for shifting
burden).
179. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas when stating that plaintiff can ultimately show intentional discrimination by persuading court that discriminatory reason more
likely motivated employer or by indirectly showing that employer's explanation is not
believable).
180. Cf. Mendez, supra note 18, at 1160 (concluding policy of Title VII should shift burden of proof, not just burden of production, to defendant in McDonnell Douglas-type cases).
181. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (observing that Court provided no
reasons for decisions on allocation of burden of persuasion); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253
(explaining that McDonnell Douglas requirement that plaintiff establish prima facie case serves
to bring court and litigants "expeditiously and fairly" to plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving
intentional discrimination).
182. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (describing plaintiff's burden as not onerous, failing to provide precedential or policy reasons for plaintiff's light burden, but explaining result in terms
of expedition and fairness without elaborating).
183. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (describing factors used in allocating
burdens of proof).
184. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (criticizing Court for lack of explanation or clarity of standards in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine).
185. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 256 (stating that prima facie case, articulated in McDonnell Douglas, creates "presumption" of unlawful discrimination and that plaintiff can rebut defendant's explanation by showing it is unworthy of credence).
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trated by the confusion in Price Waterhouse,' 8 6 which addressed the
former issue, the Court was not clear as to the significance between
a presumptive inference and a factual inference or the scope of Mc87
Donnell Douglas and Burdine.'
2. Disparate-treatmentafter 1989-PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins
a. The result
In May of 1989, the Supreme Court decided a mixed motive disparate-treatment case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'8 8 A mixed motive
case is one in which a Title VII defendant takes adverse employment
action against a plaintiff for both legitimate and discriminatory reasons.' 8 9 Because mixed motive cases themselves had been getting
disparate-treatment from the lower courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts. 190 The lower courts had
been split on a number of issues. First, once a court determined
that the case involved both legitimate and discriminatory decisionmaking factors, a question existed as to which party had to prove
what caused the adverse action.' 9 ' Did the plaintiff have to prove
that the decision would have been different, or did the defendant
have to prove that the decision would have been the same, without
the discrimination? Second, the courts disagreed as to the level of
proof required on the issue of what would have happened absent
the discrimination.' 9 2 Finally, the courts' decisions differed regarding the effect of a finding that the employer would have made the
same decision without the discrimination. Some courts held that
such a finding would absolve the defendant of liability.' 9 3 Others
186. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
187. See infra notes 210-320 and accompanying text (discussing confusion and disagreement in Price Waterhouse decision).

188.

109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).

189. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 & n.6 (1989); see Note, Clearing
the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to DisparateTreatment Under Title VII, 87 MIcH. L. REV.
863, 864 (1989) (stating that mixed motive cases essentially involve employment decision motivated by both permissible and impermissible factors; for example, employer may fire employee in part because she is female, which is impermissible, and in part because of excessive
absenteeism, which is permissible).
190. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
191. Id. at 1784 n.2 (discussing cases in which third, fourth, fifth, and seventh circuits held
that plaintiff must show that, but for discrimination, decision would be favorable and cases in
which first, second, sixth, and eleventh circuits held that employer must prove employment
decision would have been same absent discrimination).
192. See, e.g., Ostapowicz v.Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating

defendant must prove justification for employment decision by preponderance of evidence),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Harper v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir.

1975) (requiring defendant to present acceptable, legitimate business reasons for employment action); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975) (requiring employer to

provide only credible evidence of nondiscriminatory motive).
193. See, e.g., Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 715 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating
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held that it merely limited the defendant's liability. 19 4
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff had claimed that she was denied
partnership in an accounting firm in violation of Title VII section
703(a)(1) 195 because the firm had judged her based on sexual stereotypes.1 9 6 The district court found that the defendant's articulated reason for not making her a partner, that her interpersonal
skills were flawed, was legitimate and not a pretext for intentional
sex discrimination.1 9 7 The district court also found, however, that
the firm had intentionally discriminated against her during the promotion process by "giving credence and effect to" sexually stereotyped comments made by the firm's partners.19 8 The district court,
at this point, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff would not have
been made partner even if there had been no sex discrimination. 19 9
20 0
The court found that the defendant did not meet that burden.
According to the court, had the defendant met this burden, it would
employer loses unless it can persuade fact finder that adverse action would have occurred
even in absence of illegitimate reason); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931,937 (1 st Cir. 1987)
(holding when unlawful discrimination is motivating factor in employment decision, defendant must prove same decision would have been made absent discrimination in order to avoid
liability); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1983) (stating employer may only rebut finding of unlawful discrimination by showing same decision would
have been made absent consideration of illegal factor).
194. See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding liability
established when plaintiff shows unlawful motive part of decision but defendant may limit
relief by showing decision would have been same absent discrimination); Fadhl v. City of San
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (showing by plaintiff that unlawful motive was
significant factor establishes liability, but relief may be limited by defendant showing result
would have been same without discrimination).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
196. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1781 (1989) (plurality opinion). At
Price Waterhouse, a senior manager becomes a partnership candidate when the person's
name is submitted by the partners. Id. All partners may submit written comments on each
candidate which are reviewed by the Admissions Committee, which then submits its recommendations to the Policy Board. Id. The Policy Board then decides whether to submit the
candidate's name for a vote, hold it for the following year, or reject it. Id.
197. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C. 1985) (describing
variety of evidence that showed plaintiff's conduct justified criticism of her interpersonal
skills).
198. Id. at 1118-19. Although the district court characterized the sexual stereotyping as
"unconscious," it also found that the system created unconscious discrimination by relying on
an "outmoded attitudes" determination. Id.
199. Id. at 1120 (stating once plaintiff proves sex discrimination played role in decision,
she prevails unless employer demonstrates decision would have been same without
discrimination).
200. Id. (observing that even when decision is mix of legitimate and discriminatory considerations, uncertainties will be resolved against employer in order to serve Title VII's remedial purpose).
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have avoided equitable relief but not liability. 20
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1

The court of appeals affirmed the allocation of proof but reversed
as to the consequences. 20 2 That court held that if the defendant
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would not have
made the plaintiff a partner had there been no stereotyping, then
20 3
defendant would'avoid liability.

The Supreme Court upheld in part and reversed in part the court
of appeals' decision. 20 4 It reversed on the issue of the level of proof,
holding that the defendant's burden was to prove that the plaintiff

would have been denied partnership without the discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence, not a clear and convincing stan-

dard. 205 Otherwise, the Supreme Court, by a plurality with two separate concurrences, affirmed the court of appeals. 20 6 The Court
affirmed the allocation to the defendant of proving that the adverse
employment decision would have been the same without the discrimination, once the plaintiff proved that there were motivating
factors or substantial discrimination in the decision-making process.2 0 7 It also affirmed that if the defendant met this burden, the
20 8 Three justices dissented. 20 9
defendant would have no liability.
b.

The confusion-with clarification from basic principles

Unfortunately, Price Waterhouse has the potential that Justice Kennedy foresees as causing "confusion and complexity,"2 10 not be-

cause the area of law is confusing and complex, but because the
opinions are. Although there were some agreements among the

plurality, concurrences, and dissent, there were many disagreements
as well. 21 1 The plurality and concurrences agreed that the burden
of proving that the employment decision would have been the same
201. Id. at 1120-21. The district court denied relief, however, on the ground that the
plaintiff had voluntarily left the firm after the adverse promotion decision and had not been
constructively discharged. Id. at 1121. The court of appeals reversed the constructive discharge findings. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,473 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This issue
was not before the Supreme Court. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1781 n.1
(1989).
202. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
203. Id. at 472.
204. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussing portions of court of appeals
decision affirmed by Supreme Court and those reversed).
205. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989) (plurality opinion).
206. Id. at 1795 (plurality opinion); id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1796
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 1787-88.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia, J.).
210. Id. at 1810 (Kennedy,j., dissenting).
211. See infra notes 212-320 and accompanying text (discussing agreements and disagreements in multiple opinions in Price Waterhouse decision).
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absent the discrimination was the defendant's, that the burden was
met by a preponderance of the evidence, and that if met, the de21 2
fendant would have no liability.
The Justices disagreed as to the type of analysis to use in determining when to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.2 13 They
214
disareed as to the applicability of precedent in that analysis.
Those Justices who agreed to shift the burden to the defendant disagreed as to what the plaintiff must prove to trigger the shift.21 5 Finally, those Justices who agreed to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant disagreed as to how the defendant could meet the burden. 21 6 A return to some basic litigation principles would harmonize the disagreements and guide subsequent decisions.2 17
i. Shifting the burden of proof
The plurality, concurrences, and dissent of Price Waterhouse disagreed as to when the burden of proof should shift to the defend-

ant. 218 Oddly, for a case involving shifting the burden of proof, the
Justices did not refer to treatises on evidence that analyze the issue.
The only treatises referred to were tort treatises cited by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, who discussed shifting burdens of proof in
tort cases. 219
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, began the analysis not
by discussing the law with respect to allocation of burden of proof,
but by discussing what constitutes a violation of Title VII and how
that statute balances rights between employees and employers.2 20
212. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989) (plurality opinion); see id.
at 1796 (White, J., concurring) (agreeing with plurality that defendant must prove by preponderance of evidence that employment decision would have been same absent unlawful motivation, and if defendant carries this burden there is no Title VII violation); see also id. at 1796
(O'Connor, J., concurring). This Article will not address the level of proof and remedial
issues.
213. See infra notes 218-65 and accompanying text (describing differences in burden shifting analyses).
214. See infra notes 266-94 and accompanying text (discussing various applications of precedent in burden shifting analyses).
215. See infra notes 295-316 and accompanying text (comparing differing views on what
constitutes plaintiff's burden of proof).
216. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text (explaining disagreement on requirements for satisfying defendant's burden of proof).
217. See infra notes 256-65 and accompanying text (providing framework for evaluating
requirements of Price Waterhouse standard).

218. See infra notes 219-65 and accompanying text (discussing varying opinions as to when
burden should shift to defendant).
219. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1798 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON ThE LAW OF TORTS

§ 153, at 865 (1912)); id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
220. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784-87.
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The plurality addressed the meaning of "because of. .. " sex in section 703(a) (1), alth9ugh the plurality did not explicitly say what role
the substance of a statute plays in allocating burdens of proof.22 1
The plurality said that section 703 (a) is violated when discrimination
is a factor in the adverse employment decision without a showing
that "but for" the discrimination the decision would have been
favorable. 2 22 The plurality later noted, however, that the employer
would avoid liability by proving as an affirmative defense that its discrimination did not cause the plaintiff's rejection. 223
Apparently, by discussing what constitutes a violation and a defense, the plurality used the burden shifting theory which requires
the plaintiff to prove the elements of a cause of action and the defendant to prove affirmative defenses. 2 24 As discussed above, this
theory requires courts to decide which elements of a case are plaintiff's and which are defendant's. 2 25 The plurality, however, did not
discuss allocation of elements. Apparently, too, the plurality
seemed to believe that burden shifting theory required the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant "violated" the act although the plurality
also noted that if the defendant proved an affirmative defense, there
would be no liability. 2 26 If there is no liability, it is not clear what
purpose labeling the defendant a violator serves. Allocation of burdens theory does not require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant violated Title VII.227 Policy, convenience, fairness, and
probabilities all can justify shifting the burden of persuasion. 228
Justice Kennedy apparently agreed with the "plead the elements"
theory of burden shifting although he, too, did not discuss basic
legal principles on that subject.2 2 9 He reached a different result,
however, because he disagreed as to what constitutes the elements
of the plaintiff's case. Although the plurality believed that the plaintiff proved her case if she established that the defendant intention221. Id. at 1785; see supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (discussing factors which are
considered in allocation of burdens).
222. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1785.
223. See id. at 1783, 1787-88 (stating employer's burden "most appropriately deemed"
affirmative defense and liability may be avoided only by proving same decision would have
been made absent discrimination).
224. Id. at 1788.
225. See supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text (discussing different factors used to
shift burdens of proof and noting that commentators agree that "plead the elements" rule for
allocating burdens not useful).
226. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1775.
227. See supra notes 20-140 and accompanying text (explaining allocation of burdens
theory).
228. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (describing factors which may be used
in determining allocation of burdens of proof.
229. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note 224 and
"pleading the elements" rule).
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ally discriminated in the decision process, the dissent believed that
the plaintiff must prove not only the existence of intentional discrimination, but also the lack of its harmless error in the decision.23 0
Thus, the dissent concluded that the plaintiff in a Title VII case has
the burden of proving both intentional discrimination and a "but
for" causal link between the discrimination and the adverse employment decision.2 3 1 The dissent would allocate both burdens to the
plaintiff because the statute's drafters did not intend to impose liability "in cases where discriminatory animus did not actually cause
an adverse action

. .

." and that "[t]he ultimate question in every

individual disparate-treatment case is whether discrimination caused
the particular decision at issue."'23 2 Determining the ultimate question does not, however, determine the burden of proof.2 33 Requiring the defendant to prove that already proven discrimination did
not cause harm does not "impose liability.., where discriminatory
animus did not actually cause an adverse action. '234 Liability is imposed on the defendant when the defendant cannot prove lack of
causation; no liability is imposed when the defendant proves that its
discrimination did not cause an adverse employment action.
In his brief concurrence, Justice White asserted the needlessness
of semantic discussions about causation and affirmative defenses.2 35
Rather, he agreed with the plurality's burden shifting result that if
the plaintiff proved that an illegitimate reason was a substantial or
motivating factor in an adverse employment action, then the employer must prove that the decision would have been the same without the illegitimate consideration.23 6 Neither he, nor the case he
relied on, however, discussed basic burden of proof principles.2 37
230. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see id. at 1809-10,
1814 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (addressing elements that plaintiff need prove).
231. Id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1811, 1813 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
233. See supra notes 30-54 and accompanying text (discussing factors to consider when
allocating burden of proof, and observing that commentators agree that determining ultimate
issues does not determine burden of proof.
234. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring) (citing Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). The plaintiff in Mount Healthy alleged a violation of his first
amendment rights when the school board refused to rehire him. Mount Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977). The district court found that the employer was
motivated by legitimate and illegitimate factors. Id. at 284-85. The Supreme Court held that
the burden was properly placed on the plaintiff to show his conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision. Id. at 287. The Court, however, also held that the
district court should have then required the employer to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that its decision would have been the same absent the protected conduct. Id. at 287.
237. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring); see Mount Healthy, 429
U.S. at 287 (holding when employee carries burden of proving protected conduct was sub-
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Justice O'Connor wrote a lengthy concurrence. 238 Although she
agreed with the plurality's burden shifting result, Justice O'Connor
disagreed with their view as to what constitutes a violation of, and
thus with their view as to the elements of, Title VII.23 9 In actuality,
therefore, her disagreement lay with the plurality's unstated burden
shifting theory of pleading the elements. 2 40 Justice O'Connor
would shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant for policy
reasons when the plaintiff has proved discrimination, even though
the plaintiff has not proved liability. 2 4 ' Shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant for the deterrent purposes underlying a statute is a
24 2
legitimate burden shifting theory.
Justice O'Connor believed that an employer violates Title VII
when consideration of illegitimate criterion is the "but for" cause of
an adverse employment action, 24 3 disagreeing with the plurality's
discussion that distinguished the phrase "because of ... sex" from
"but for" causation.2 44 She did not believe that it follows that the
2 45 Implicplaintiff has the burden of proving "but for" causation.
itly, therefore, she recognized that there are other burden shifting
theories besides the "pleading the elements" theory.2 4 6 She appeared to recognize, again implicitly, a burden shifting theory based
on policy. Referring to legislative history, she said that although Title VII "conditioned legal liability" on a discriminatory employment
injury, it also sought to deter employers from relying on race or
gender in making employment decisions.2 4 7 She said that the employer is no longer entitled to the same presumption of good faith
which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, 248 noting that once the plaintiff establishes intentional discrimination, the plaintiff has proven the existence of the
stantial factor in employment decision, employer must then show same decision would have
been reached absent protected conduct, but not discussing burden of proof principles).
238. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796-1807 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 1796-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing plurality's pleading the elements rule); see also supra notes 30-54 (describing different factors used to shift burdens of
proof).
241. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text (discussing policy as valid reason for
shifting burden of proof).
243. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 1797-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor does appear to acknowledge the "plead the elements" theory when she says, "[n]o doubt, as a general matter, Congress assumed that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would bear the burden of proof on the
elements critical to his or her case." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 1798-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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type of conduct Title VII seeks to deter.2 49 In addition, it may be
extremely difficult to prove what might have been. 250 If it cannot be

proven, the party without the burden of proof will

win.251

If the

employer did not have the burden of proving that legitimate factors
caused its employment decision, then it could win even though it
actually used discrimination to make the decision. 25 2
The concurrences of both Justices White and O'Connor rejected
the plurality's characterization of the defendant's burden as an affirmative defense. 25 3 Neither of the concurring Justices explained
why they rejected that characterization. They did agree with the
plurality's result that the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant. 254 Perhaps they believed that such a characterization requires a
finding that the defendant had violated Title VII. This belief could
249. Id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (stating "but-for" test can demand impossible
probe into unknowable state of affairs (quoting Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN.
L. REv. 60, 67 (1956))); see id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that entire purpose of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case requirement to compensate for "fact that direct
evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by").
251. Id. at 1802-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
252. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor gave another rationale besides deterrence for shifting the burden of proof-that a fact finder could conclude, absent further
explanation, that the employer's discriminatory motivation caused the employment decision.
This argument returns to the "prove the elements" burden shifting theory and finds the causation element proven as the result of a presumption, using the similar "absent explanation"
phrase found in Furnco and Burdine. Id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (stating establishment of prima facie
case creates presumption of unlawful discrimination and if employer is "silent" in light of
such presumption, court must enter judgment for plaintiff); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (observing that prima facie case raises inference of discrimination
because court will assume acts, "if otherwise unexplained," are more likely than not based on
impermissible factors); see also supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing plurality's
"prove the elements" theory). Justice O'Connor objected to the theory that the plaintiff had
proved a Title VII violation, Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1798, 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring), yet she would presume causation from plaintiff's facts. Id. at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Price Waterhouse, however, the defendant had profferred an explanation as to
cause and had articulated, as well as proven, another motive. See id. at 1781. Therefore, a
presumption of but for causation would have burst. See supra notes 67-71, 114-20 and accompanying text (explaining bursting presumptions). Causation, but not "but for" causation, can
be inferred. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (proposing that
plaintiff be required to produce sufficient evidence for reasonable fact finder to draw an "inference" that employment decision was made "because of" plaintiff's protected status) (emphasis
added). But see id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that when plaintiff has made
such strong showing fact finder is "entitled to presume that employer's discriminatory animus"
made difference in outcome) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor's policy discussions are
perfectly adequate rationales for shifting the burden of proof, however. See supra notes 30-54
and accompanying text (discussing factors which may be considered in allocating burdens of
proof). Apparently, she does not recognize the adequacy of the policy rationales because she
adds the presumption rationale in a way that creates more confusion. See Price Waterhouse, 109
S. Ct. at 1803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that Title VII intended to deter explicit consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment decisions).
253. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J.,concurring); id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
254. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1806 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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be justified by the plurality's discussion of the defendant's violation
prior to finding liability. 255 In litigation, however, the burdens of
proof are allocated among the plaintiff and the defendant and only
after each has met, or not met, those burdens is liability determined. 25 6 An affirmative defense is only a label to indicate that a
defendant has the burden of persuasion. 2 57 Conversely, if the defendant has the burden of persuasion, then what defendant must
prove, by definition, is an affirmative defense.
In addition, the structure of Title VII supports an affirmative defense allocation to the defendant.2 5 8 Section 703(a) defines an unlawful employment practice as "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's ...sex." 25 9 It does not matter whether
section 703(a) requires "but for" causation because another section
does; section 706(g) provides that an employer will not be liable if
the adverse employment decision was made for reasons other than
sex, for example. 260 Structurally, this appears to be an affirmative
defense, with the burden of persuasion allocated to the defendant to
prove that the action for which relief is sought was caused by a rea261
son other than sex.
Thus, a litigation focused analysis of Price Waterhouse reveals that
the plurality and concurrences have no substantive disagreement
with respect to allocating proof in mixed motive disparate-treatment
26 2
employment discrimination cases, only semantic disagreements.
Because six Justices agreed that the burden of proof should shift to
the defendant, it is curious that they should have such long discussions disputing the rationale without really identifying the center of
their dispute. 2 63 Although there is lengthy debate as to what consti255.
256.

Id. at 1784.
See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (explaining effect of presumption and

inference on burdens of proof allocation).
257. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative defenses).
258. See infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (finding support for affirmative defense
language in Title VII).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
261. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing structure of affirmative defenses); see also supra notes 24-140 and accompanying text (explaining allocation of burdens of

proof).
262. See supra notes 220-53 and accompanying text (detailing agreement between plurality
and concurrences on shifting burden to defendant but disagreement on language employed
to evaluate same).
263. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1780 (announcingjudgment of Court, Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); see also supra notes 224-28, 23642 and accompanying text (detailing agreement between plurality and concurrences to shift
burden of proof to defendant).
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tutes a violation of Title VII, the debate is unnecessary when one
realizes that there are many theories justifying the shift of the burden of proof.264 Lower courts and litigants in these cases should
not have difficulty in knowing how to proceed with the allocation of
the burden of persuasion because the differing rationales do not
change the result. 2 65 Once the plaintiff has produced evidence that
persuades the fact finder that discrimination motivated the employment action, the employer must persuade the fact finder that the
action would have occurred even without the discrimination.
ii. Application of Title VII precedent
The Justices in Price Waterhouse also disagreed as to the significance of Title VII precedent. 2 6 6 The plurality and Justice White
found it distinguishable. 26 7 Justice O'Connor, however, found that
courts must depart from precedent, and Justice Kennedy found it
2 68
controlling.
The plurality said that its opinion was not inconsistent with Burdine, 269 because the opinion did not require the defendant to prove
that its legitimate reason was true and did require the plaintiff to
prove that gender played a part in the employment decision. 270 The
plurality then said that Price Waterhouse is not a Burdine "shifting burdens" case, but rather an affirmative defense case. 2 7 ' Although Justice White, in his concurrence, believed that it was not necessary to
discuss affirmative defenses, he did agree with the plurality that Burdine was inapposite because it involved one motive, not mixed motives, for the adverse employment decision. 2 72 Both the plurality
and Justice White are correct to hold that Burdine is not apposite but
neither opinion explains why clearly.
The distinction between a presumptive case and a finding of fact
from inferences case explains the distinction between Burdine and
264. See supra notes 220-26, 238-44 and accompanying text (detailing discussions in plurality and concurring opinions as to what constitutes Title VII violation); see also supra notes
30-54 and accompanying text (discussing factors which may be used to shift burden of proof).
265. See infra notes 295-306 and accompanying text (explaining Court's view of what triggers shift of burden of proof to defendant).
266. See infra notes 261-72 (discussing Court's disagreement over significance of Title VII
precedent).
267. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1788-89; id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring).
268. Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1809-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
269. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) in explaining that when plaintiff
successfully proves prima facie case, burden shifts to defendant to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for employment decision).
270. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1788.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring).
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Price Waterhouse.2 73 The plaintiff's case in Burdine is based only on a
presumption, not on evidence, the inferences from which convinced
a fact finder that discrimination had occurred. 274 In Price Waterhouse,
however, the plaintiff produced evidence from which the fact finder
found that the employer used a discriminatory factor in the hiring
decision. 2 75 The plaintiff did not merely claim that she was a woman, applied for and was qualified for the promotion, was rejected,
27 6
and that any number of people could have been made partner.
Rather, she produced evidence of sexual stereotyping.2 7 7 Although
a presumption based on the McDonnell Douglas factors will burst
once a defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, 2 78 the inference drawn from the evidence of stereotyping will not burst; it must be believed or not. 27 9 Thus, Price
Waterhouse is not a presumptive case and the allocation of proof fol-

lowed in the presumptive McDonnell Douglas and Burdine cases is not
appropriate.
Justice O'Connor characterized the Price Waterhouse framework as
a change in direction from McDonnellDouglas and Burdine,2 s0 because
those cases emphasized that "plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation" and assumed that the plaintiff must
prove that the employer's explanation was not a motivating factor.28 1 She is correct that those cases hold that the plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion, but they do so because they are "bursting
bubble" presumption cases. The presumption bursts when a rebuttal is articulated, leaving the plaintiff to prove the elements for
28 2
which he or she has the burden of proof, whatever they may be.
273. See supra notes 55-78, 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing difference between
presumption and inference generally).

274. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (explaining Burdine's holding with regard to requirements of prima facie case).
275. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 (accepting district court's conclusion that number
of partner's comments showed sex stereotyping).
276. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (summarizing
plaintiff's initial burden of establishing prima facie case of discrimination); accord Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981) (relating plaintiff's burden of
establishing prima fade case to shift in burden of proof to defendant).
277. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1793-94 (characterizing as "inevitable" conclusion that
firm took comments motivated by "stereotypical notions" of women's department into account in making decision).
278. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (explaining effect of rebuttable
presumption).
279. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (explaining effect of factual inference).
280. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (terming case as "supplement to" and "departure from" McDonnell Douglas and Burdine).
281. Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that McDonnell Douglas and Burdine

assumed that plaintiff must show that employer's explanation was not "the true reason" either
because it never motivated the employer or because it did not do so in particular case).
282. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (explaining effect of rebuttable
presumption).
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Certainly, McDonnell Douglas and Burdine do not eliminate the possibility that a defendant might have an affirmative defense.2 8 3
Justice Kennedy, in contrast to the plurality and concurrences, believed that Title VII precedent alone controlled Price Waterhouse,2 8 4
despite the fact that he acknowledged that the precedent is not
clear. 2 85 His analysis of precedent, however, only resolved half of
the issue in Price Waterhouse.
Justice Kennedy would have held that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving both (1) intentional discrimination and (2) causationthat the adverse employment decision would have been favorable
without the discrimination. 286 Although at times Justice Kennedy
treated the two issues of discrimination and causation as if they were
one, at other times he treated the issues as distinct.2 8 7 For example,
his statement that Burdine holds that the plaintiff has the, burden of
proving "that the defendant intentionally discriminated" indicates
an awareness that precedent allocates to the plaintiff the burden of
proving that the defendant intentionally discriminated.2 8 8 That
283. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (defining affirmative defenses). Unfortunately, Title VII precedent does not provide clear guidance because of its failure to define its
terms. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (criticizing ambiguous language in early
Title VII cases). For example, McDonnell Douglas implies and Burdine holds that after the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. See
supra notes 150-87 and accompanying text (discussing burden of proof in McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine cases). By not discussing the type of prima facie case involved in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the Court left open an implication that plaintiff's burden can never shift after
the establishment of a prima facie case. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff's burden of proof in McDonnell Douglas). Certain language from Burdine contributes to that implication. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981) (holding "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff"). This is an
incorrect implication, however, because at some point in all litigation, the burden of proof will
shift to the defendant if the plaintiff's evidence convinces the fact finder of the plaintiff's case.
See supra notes 80-134 and accompanying text (discussing allocation and shifting of burdens of
proof during litigation process). The defendant will then have the burden of proving an affirmative defense. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (explaining defendant's burden of proving affirmative defense). With respect to the "assumptions" of McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine, Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring), they are implicit
dicta. It is speculative to interpret what a case "assumes" with respect to facts and issues not
before it.
284. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1809-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (adhering to established evidentiary framework of Burdine because it provides proper standard for disparatetreatment cases).
285. Id. at 1806, 1812 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (explaining that law in this area is "already
difficult for the bench and bar" and that "[liower courts long have had difficulty applying
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine").

286. Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Burdine provides mechanism to
determine "whether initial discrimination has caused employment decision").
288. Id. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). At a later point, the dissent again referred only to the
issue of discrimination, repeating the belief that the framework provided by the precedents
permits the plaintiff "to demonstrate intentional discrimination"). Id. at 1812 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
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statement says nothing about causation, however.
The precedent Justice Kennedy cited for allocating the burden of
proving causation once discrimination has been proved is not case
law but his "belie[f that] continued adherence to the Burdine framework is more consistent with the statutory mandate [and that] Congress' manifest concern with preventing imposition of liability in
cases where discriminatory animus did not actually cause an adverse
action.., suggests to [Justice Kennedy] that an affirmative showing
[by the plaintiff] of causation should be required." 28 9 This statement did not suggest that Burdine or other precedent had already
allocated to the plaintiff the burden of proving causation, but rather
that Justice Kennedy believed that Burdine should be so extended.
Allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant, however,
does not impose liability on a defendant who can prove that its discrimination did not cause plaintiff's injury. It means that when
there is doubt as to the cause, the defendant, who has been proved
to have discriminated, will be found liable.
The dissent also relied on Burdine for the proposition that after
the defendant has articulated a legitimate reason, "a plaintiff may
succeed in meeting her ultimate burden of persuasion 'either directly
by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
preferred explanation is unworthy of credence.' "290 He then cited
a concurrence in United States Postal Service Board v. 4ikens 291 as holding that direct proof involves "persuad[ing] the court that the employment decision more likely than not was motivated by a
discriminatory reason. ' 29 2 His reliance on these cases implies that
they are precedent for a holding that the plaintiff must prove that
the discriminatory motive was the "more likely" motivation. 2 93 The
discussion, however, in both of those cases was dicta, which is not
controlling precedent. Both Burdine and Aikens considered whether
the employer used its articulated reason to make the hiring decision.2 9 4 One way of proving that the employer did not use the ar289. Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
290. Id. at 1810 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
291. 460 U.S. 711, 712 (1983) (considering charge of racial discrimination as motive for
failure to promote black U.S. Postal Service employee). For a discussion of how Aikens added
considerable confusion to disparate-treatment analysis, see Note, Indirect Proofof Discriminatory
Motive in Title VII DisparateTreatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1114, 1123 (1988)
(maintaining that Aikens further complicated issues by characterizing McDonnell Douglas as direct rather than indirect proof case).
292. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
Postal Serv. Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717-18 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
293. Id. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
294. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (holding
defendant bears burden of explaining nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions); Aikens, 460
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ticulated reason is to prove what reason the employer did use.
Neither case involved a situation where the plaintiff did not prove
pretext, did not prove that the legitimate reason was not the true
reason, but proved that two factors went into the decision, one legitimate and one discriminatory.
iii. Plaintiff's showing- "substantial," "motivating," or "play a
part"
The plurality summarized its resolution of the burden shifting issue by saying: "once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such
a role." 29 5 The plurality defined a "motivating part" of an employment decision as "one of those reasons" for the employer's decision.2 9 6 The plurality noted that stereotypical remarks do not alone
"inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision;" the plaintiff must also show "that the employer ac7
tually relied on her gender." 29
Justice O'Connor characterized the level of discrimination necessary as "substantial" and "relied upon" to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 2 98 She defined "substantial" as evidence
from which a fact finder could draw an inference that the discriminaU.S. at 716 (remanding case on grounds that district court must decide which party's explana-

tion of employer's motivation to believe).
295. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88 (emphasis added). The plurality characterized
this formulation of the balance of burdens as the direct result of Title VII's balance of rights.
Id. at 1788.
296. Id. at 1790 (posing situation in which, if one asked employer at moment of decision
what its reasons were, response included as one reason that employee was female); id. at 1785
(referring to congressional intent to forbid employers to take gender into account); id. at 1788
(holding that plaintiff retains burden of persuasion of whether gender played a part in decision); id. at 1793 (upholding district court finding that sex stereotyping "was permitted to play
a part") (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985)).
297. Id. at 1791 (holding that plaintiff can make this showing by offering sex stereotyped
remarks as evidence that gender played a part in decision); see id. at 1786 (concluding that
Congress intended that plaintiff must prove that employer relied upon sex-based considerations). The plurality rejected the suggestion of the defendant that sex stereotyping lacks legal
relevance, noting that an employer who objects to aggressive women at the same time it requires this trait for job success, places women in a "Catch-22" situation: "out of ajob if they
behave aggressively and out of a job if they don't." Id. at 1791.
298. Id. at 1804 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (noting that, to avoid bearing burden ofjustifying its decision, employer need only avoid "substantial reliance on forbidden criteria"); see
id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that defendant placed "substantial negative
reliance" on illegitimate criterion); id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting that

deterrence purpose of statute is triggered by evidence that illegitimate criterion was "substan-

tial" factor in adverse decision); id. at 1803 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (noting conviction that
standard of "substantial factor" does not conflict with congressional policy as embodied in
Title VII).
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tion caused the adverse employment decision. 2 99 Justice O'Connor
believed that this is a different approach from that of the plurality
who do not view causation as part of a section 703(a) "because of
...
sex" violation.3 0 0 She believed that the plurality uses a lesser
standard. 30 The plurality, on the other hand, did not believe that
its description of the plaintiff's proof differs from Justice
30 2
O'Connor's description.
Their views can be harmonized. The plurality based its standard
of proof on the words "motivating" and "rely.13 0 3 These terms imply some degree of causation. Justice O'Connor's standard is "substantial reliance." 3 0 4 Justice White combines the terms when he
relies upon a first amendment burden shifting case that uses the
words "substantial" and "motivating" synonymously.3 0 5 Based on
these opinions, a lower court could safely shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant upon finding that the plaintiff had produced evidence of discrimination in the decisional process that is
substantial enough to justify an inference that it in part caused, motivated, or was relied upon in the employer's decision. The plaintiff
must produce more than a presumption to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant. The plaintiff must produce evidence from which
the fact finder can conclude or infer that the employer intentionally
discriminated. This is consistent with the distinction between Burdine, which presumed discrimination from four minimal factors, and
Price Waterhouse, which inferred discrimination from substantial
3 06
evidence.
299. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also discussed the evidence
that will not trigger the shift of the burden of proof to the defendant. It would not include
stray remarks, statements unrelated to the decision-making process, testimony by a social psychologist "standing alone," or benign awareness of race or gender. Id. at 1804-05
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
300. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 1804 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (characterizing plurality standard as decision
"tainted" by awareness of sex in any way).
302. Id. at 1790 n.13 (expressing inability to understand why concurrence suggests that
standards are meaningfully different).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 295-97 (describing level of proof that will shift
burden to defendant).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 298-302 (relating Justice O'Connor's view of level
of proof needed).
305. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring) (citing Mount Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
306. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (summarizing four factors that establish
prima facie case in disparate-treatment cases). The plurality and concurrences agreed that the
evidence in Price Waterhouse was sufficient to trigger the defendant's burden of proof. Id. at
1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with plurality that burden of persuasion should
shift to employer to demonstrate that it would have reached same decision with no gender
consideration and that this shift is part of liability phase of litigation); accordid.at 1795 (White,
J., concurring) (agreeing that plaintiff met burden by showing unlawful motive was substantial
factor and that burden properly shifted at that point to defendant to prove it would have
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Plaintiff's evidence-"direct" or "circumstantial"

Justice Kennedy in dissent claimed that the Court's holding requires the plaintiff to produce "direct evidence" of discrimination to
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant.3 0 7 He criticized
this result on the grounds that courts will have to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" or "circumstantial" evidence.3 08 The
reference to direct evidence is from Justice O'Connor's concurrence.3 0 9 The plurality did not use that term to describe the requisite evidence.
The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, however, is not the distinction that courts must draw.3 1 0 The correct
distinction is between a presumption and an inference. Justice
O'Connor described McDonnell Douglas as a case based on "no direct
evidence that the employer had relied on a forbidden factor,"3 1 but
one "based only on the statistical probability that when a number of
potential causes for an employment decision are eliminated, an inference arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the motivation. '3 1 2
Justice O'Connor, however, misstated McDonnell Douglas. The presumption of intentional discrimination in McDonnell Douglas was
based on statistical probabilities before the defendant introduces evidence should the defendant remain silent and not introduce evidence. The statistical probability that eliminates legitimate reasons
for the employment action arises only if the defendant does not offer an explanation. The plaintiff's prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas is established, therefore, before the defendant may articulate an explanation. Thus, it is not that the plaintiff has not offered
"direct evidence" of intentional discrimination, rather, plaintiff has
not yet offered either direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination occurred. The plaintiff need offer only evidence that she apmade same decision). Even the dissent agreed that a finding of "but for" causation was warranted by the evidence. Id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
307. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (opining that Price
Waterhouse scheme applies only when plaintiff has produced direct and substantial proof of
impermissible motive).
308. Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (predicting that cases will become more difficult because
courts must develop standards to determine when to apply burden shift).
309. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (characterizing what is required as being what
Hopkins showed, "direct evidence" that decision-makers substantially relied on illegitimate
criterion); see id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (writing that plaintiff in disparate-treatment case must show by "direct evidence" that illegitimate criterion was substantial factor in
its decision).
310. But see Note, supra note 19, at 893 (concluding that most useful approach is to focus
on whether plaintiff's evidence is direct or indirect).
311. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
312. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (noting that McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case is not difficult to prove and this compensates for fact that direct evidence of
intentional discrimination is "hard to come by").
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plied for a job, was qualified, rejected and protected by Title VII
and that the job remained open.3 13 The court will presume discrimination until the defendant articulates an explanation, at which point
the presumptive inference disappears, indicating that it was not a
31 4
factual inference.
Thus, when Justice O'Connor asserts that the plaintiff must offer
direct evidence to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant,
she really means that the plaintiff must produce some evidence,
either direct or circumstantial, that the employer intentionally discriminated.3 15 The distinction the courts must make in deciding the
burden shifting issue is between a presumption and an inference,
not between direct or indirect evidence. A presumption is a legally
mandated conclusion that is based on minimal, judicially identified
evidence. An inference is logically drawn from evidence above that
minimum, and can be drawn from direct, circumstantial, or indirect
evidence.3 16
v.

Defendant's proof

The plurality said that, to meet its burden of persuasion, the defendant had to prove "objective" evidence that its discrimination
did not cause the decision. 31 7 The plurality also held that proof that
the decision could have been justified was not the same as proving
318
that it had been justifiably made.
Justice White, disagreeing with the plurality, suggested that the
defendant could meet its burden merely with testimony.31 9 The
plurality strongly disagreed with Justice White, believing that al313.

See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing facts needed to satisfy prima

facie case).
314. See supra notes 30-54 (discussing difference between inference and presumption).
Once the defendant articulates an explanation, the plaintiff may rebut the defendant's evidence by offering "competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for [... the decision] were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
315. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that, under her
approach, plaintiff must offer evidence sufficient to allow fact finder to infer that decision was
made on basis of illegitimate criterion).
316. See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text (discussing presumptions and
inferences).
317. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 (holding that, in most cases, employer should
present "objective evidence" of its decision, absent illegal motive).
318. Id. (relying on Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416
(1979), which quoted Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1977)). Ayers held that a showing that the same decision was justified on other grounds is
not equivalent to proving that the same decision would have been made. Ayers, 555 F.2d at
1315.
319. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring) (reasoning that, in context
of mixed motive case where legitimate motive justified decision, where employer credibly testifies to existence of legitimate reason for decision, "this should be ample proof").
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lowing the defendant to meet its burden with mere testimony
defeats the point of the burden.3 20
In this instance, it is the plurality that appears to confuse the difference between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. If Price Waterhouse had held that the defendant had only the
burden of producing evidence about causation, then allowing the
burden to be met with subjective testimony would undermine any
benefit that the plaintiff might have obtained by the shift.
Price Waterhouse, however, held that the burden of proof shifted to
the defendant. Even if the defendant produces subjective testimony, the fact finder might not believe it. When the fact finder does
believe the testimony, however, no viable argument exists to pro3 21
hibit it from having a probative effect.

C.
1.

Allocation of Proofin Disparate-ImpactCases

Disparate-impactcases prior to 1989

In prior disparate-impact cases, a plaintiff established his or her
prima facie case by showing that a neutral employment practice
caused a disproportionate exclusion of a Title VII class from the
employer's workforce. 322 The employment practice could be an objective screening device such as a standardized test or required educational

level, 3 23

or a

subjective

screening device such as

discretionary supervisory opinion. 324 Plaintiffs did not have to
prove that the employer intended to discriminate; proof of a disparate-impact on a protected class caused by the employment practice
was sufficient for plaintiff's case. 32 5 Defendant then had the burden

of proving a business necessity for the employment practice causing
320. Id. at 1791 n.14 (characterizingJustice White's suggestion as "baffling"). The plurality notes that the premise in a mixed motive case is that a legitimate reason for the decision
exists, and that the employer must prove not the existence of the legitimate reason but that it
was the motivating force behind the decision. Id. at 1791-92.
321. See id. at 1796 (White, J., concurring) (stating that employer must credibly testify as
to legitimate motive).
322. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (challenging minimum height
and weight requirement that affected women applicants for prison guard positions); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (contending that seniority
system effectively perpetuated minority group's low status); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971) (contesting intelligence tests and high school diploma requirement that
barred minority employment).
323. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (ruling that practices, such as intelligence tests, that are
fair in form but effectively discriminatory are prohibited unless practice is related to job
performance).
324. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (holding that subjective selection methods of promotion may have same effect as objective methods, thus proper
analysis is disparate-impact).
325. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (holding that employer's practice violated Title VII
even though district court had found that employer did not discriminate intentionally).
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3 26
the disparate-impact.

2.

Disparate-impactcases after 1989-Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio
a.

The holding as it erroneously conforms to disparate-treatmentcases

In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court decided that not only are plaintiffs in disparate-impact cases required to prove disparate-impact
caused by a neutral employment practice, but also, if the employer
produces evidence to justify the practice, the plaintiffs will have the
burden of proving that the employer did not need to use the employment practice or that the employer could use another practice
equally well to achieve the same purposes without the discriminatory impact.3 27 This allocation of proof is similar to that in disparate-treatment cases. In fact, the Court cited a disparate-treatment
case, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,3 28 and also used
language describing the allocation of proof that was similar to that
used in Burdine.3 29 Wards Cove spoke of the plaintiff "establish[ing] a
prima facie case" 3 3 0 by proving that "application of a specific or particular employment practice.., created the disparate-impact."' 33 ' If
established, "the case will shift to any business justification [the employers] offer for their use of these practices." 33 2 At this point "the
employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business
justification for his employment practice," but "[t]he burden of persuasion, however, remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff. '3 33
Burdine had also explained that the defendant's burden was to produce evidence but that the plaintiff retains the burden of
33 4
persuasion.
326. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (holding that once it is shown that employment standards
are discriminatory, employer must prove that challenged standards are related to job); Griggs,
401 U.S. at 432 (holding that employer must prove that requirement has manifest relationship
to employment).
327. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). The ruling also
requires the plaintiff to identify a particular employment practice and show that it has a significant disparate-impact on employment opportunities. Id. at 2125. The Court also articulated
a broad standard of business necessity-more than a "mere insubstantial justification" but
less than "essential" or "indispensible." Id. at 2126. This Article does not address those

issues.
328. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
329. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981)).
330. Id. at 2125.
331. Id. at 2124-25. The plaintiffs in Wards Cove, non-white workers in an Alaskan cannery, charged that racial discrimination resulted from the employer's hiring and promotion
practices. Id. at 2120. The practices included nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, and a practice of not promoting from within. Id.
332. Id. at 2125.
333. Id. at 2126.
334. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 256 (1981).
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The Court defended its burden of production holding, saying that
it "conforms to the rule in disparate-treatment cases," citing Burdine
and Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 35 Both Burdine and
Rule 301, however, deal with bursting presumptions.336 In Burdine,
the plaintiff retained the burden of persuasion on the element of
intentional discrimination. Burdine held that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by pleading four facts from which a court
must presume intentional discrimination.337 Once the defendant articulated an explanation, by producing evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the
plaintiff's presumption of intentional discrimination disappears. 338
At that point, no evidence of intentional discrimination exists and
the plaintiff retains the burden of proving intentional
discrimination.
In a disparate-impact case, however, to reach the stage in which
the defendant justifies the employment practice, the plaintiff must
have already proved that an employment practice caused disparateimpact. No presumptions are involved in this prima facie case; this
is not merely a convenient allocation of production to enable a
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for a directed
verdict.3 39 Defendant's evidence of a business justification for the
practice, therefore, does not make plaintiff's prima facie case disappear. Plaintiff had proved, not presumed, its case, and therefore,
the burden should shift to the defendant to prove, not merely to
articulate, a defense.
Wards Cove did not explicitly state which element plaintiff retains
the burden of proving after the defendant provides evidence of
335. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
336. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (explaining that presumptions are
court-made devices that are rebuttable if defendant produces evidence so that presumption in
favor of plaintiff bursts or disappears).
337. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 (explaining that initial burden of plaintiff is not onerous
and effectively eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for decisions).
338. Id. at 255 (explaining that if defendant produces evidence, then presumption raised
by plaintiff's prima facie case is rebutted); see supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (noting that Burdine clarified confusion engendered by Court's failure in McDonnell Douglas to define whether defendant's burden was to "articulate" or "prove" alternate explanation for
discriminatory treatment); see also supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (explaining that
rebuttable presumption, without independently probative facts, shifts only burden of production to defendant and that if defendant articulates alternate explanation, presumption
disappears).
339. See supra notes 81-134 and accompanying text (explaining effect of presumptions
throughout litigation). See generally Note, supra note 19, at 948 (noting that plaintiff in disparate-impact case has higher standard of proof to meet than plaintiff in disparate-treatment
case). But see Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: DisparateImpact and Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419, 436 (1982)
(noting that lower burden for defendant in disparate-impact case would parallel burden in
disparate-treatment case).
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business justification. The Court implied that the element could be
either causation or discrimination.3 40 The Court also wrote that the
plaintiff must prove that it was "because of such individual's race,
color, etc., that he was denied a desired employment opportunity."'3 4 1 Is the "because of" language referring to causation, as it
did in Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Kennedy's dissent in Price Waterhouse,3 42 or is it referring to intentional discrimination? In order to shift the burden to the defendant either to prove
or to articulate business necessity, the plaintiff must have already
proved causation. Thus, the issue on which the plaintiff retains the
burden cannot be causation.
If the issue that the plaintiff must prove after the employer produces evidence of business justification is not causation, it must be
intentional discrimination. If that is what the plaintiff retains the
burden of proving, then the Court has effectively overruled Griggs,
which explicitly held that a finding of intentional discrimination was
not necessary in a disparate-impact case. 343 The Wards Cove Court,
however, said that intent is not an element.3 4 4 Thus, the Court itself
eliminated intentional discrimination as an element for which the
plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.
In summary, a close reading of Wards Cove indicates that the plaintiff does not need to produce additional evidence of causation or
any evidence of intentional discrimination. Rather, Wards Cove has
allocated to the plaintiff as part of the plaintiff's case the burden of
proving that the defendant does not have a defense of business justification. Although there are many factors for allocating burdens of
340. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989) (quoting Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) and finding that "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has
been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times").
341. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)) (emphasis added).
342. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that congressional intent was that plaintiff establish but-for causation); accord id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (contending that Title VII requires showing that illegitimate motive caused decision at issue).
343. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (noting that court of appeals
held that employer adopted restrictive job requirements without any intention to discriminate
but that absence of discriminatory intent does not excuse employment practices that operate
as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups if they are unrelated to job performance). The
Court held invalid a requirement that applicants have a high school diploma or pass a standardized intelligence test. The Court found that neither requirement was related to the employee's ability to successfully perform the job, that both requirements had a disparate-impact
on blacks and that the company had a history of filling the positions in question with whites
only. Ultimately, the employer was found liable for the disparate-impact the tests had caused.
Id.
344. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2119 (noting that "a factually neutral employment practice
may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to
discriminate that is required in a "disparate-treatment' case").
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persuasion, requiring a plaintiff to prove an absence of a defense is
unusual and is not justified by either Burdine or the Federal Rules of
34 5
Evidence.
b.

Proposed legislative correction

Congress is considering legislation, which will be titled the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, to change some of the Wards Cove conclusions. 3 46 Well-established litigation principles support the passage
of this legislation. Congress should restore the normal allocation of
burdens of proof; that is, if plaintiff proves an employment practice
or practices caused a disparate-impact, the burden then should shift
to the employer to prove a business necessity for the practice. Because proof of a disparate-impact violation does not involve the use
of a presumption, the legislation should avoid the use of the terms
presumption or rebuttal.3 4 7 In addition, because the term prima facie case has different meanings depending upon the stage of litigation in which it is used, use of that term can create confusion and
should therefore be avoided.3 48 The early House Bill introduced to
change Wards Cove contained a number of these problems by using
both the terms "prima facie violation" and "defendant may
34 9
rebut."
The Senate bill and the current House bill avoid these
problems. 350 These bills require a plaintiff to "demonstrate" that
345. See supra note 335-38 and accompanying text (discussing Burdine and Rule 301).
346. See, e.g., H.R. 2598, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H2471 (daily ed.June 12,
1989); H.R. 3157, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H5332 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989); S.
1261, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. June 23, 1989); H.R. 4000,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
347. See supra note 339 and accompanying text (explaining plaintiff's burden and use of
presumption).
348. See supra notes 80-134 and accompanying text (explaining application of prima facie
case during six possible stages of litigation).
349. See H.R. 2598, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H2471 (daily ed. June 12,
1989). House Bill 2598 provided
That section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
(k) A primafacie violation of this title shall be deemed to have been made out by
proof that the representation of the group receiving protection under this
title of which plaintiffis a member is significantly less represented in the position or among those receiving the benefit in question than among the qualified applicants, or likely qualified applicants, for the position, or eligible
persons, or likely eligible persons, for the benefit. The defendant may rebut
such a showing by proving that each part of the selection process in question
was a business necessity for the position or benefit in question was essential
to the performance of the defendant's legitimate functions.
Id. (emphasis added).
Later, the phrase "essential to the performance of the defendant's legitimate functions" was
changed to "business necessity." H.R. 3157, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H5332
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
350. The proposed legislation from the Senate provides:
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an employment practice (proposed section 703k(1)(4)) or employment practices (proposed section 703k(1)(B)) "results in a disparate-impact ....
" 'Demonstrate' is defined as "meets the burdens of
production and persuasion" (proposed section 701(m)). Thus, the
bills make clear that the plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence and persuading the fact finder that the evidence is true of
SEC. 3 DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
(1)The term "complaining party' means the Commission, the Attorney General,
or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under this title.
(m) The term "demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.
(n) The term "group of employment practices' means a combination of employment practices that produces one or more decisions with respect to employment,
employment referral, or admission to a labor organization, apprenticeship or other
training or retraining program.
(o) The term "required by business necessity' means that the challenged practice
or group of practices bears a substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective
job performance.
(p) The term "respondent' means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining including on-the-job training programs, or those Federal entities subject to the provisions of section 717 (or the heads thereof).
SEC 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE-IMPACT CASES
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPARATE-IMPACT CASES.(1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this section when(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment practice results in

a disparate-impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
and the respondent fails to demonstrate by objective evidence that such practice
is required by business necessity; or

(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a disparate-impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate by objective evidence that such
group of employment practices is required by business necessity, except that(i) if a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in a disparate-impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate which specific practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate-impact; and
(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice
within such group of employment practices does not contribute to the disparate-impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity.
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may be used as a defense only against a claim under this subsection.
S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The House bill is substantially the same as the Senate
bill, but changes the definitions of "group employment practices" and "respondent" in a way
that does not change the discussion in this Article. To provisions 703(k)(1)(A) and (B), the
House bill has added that the respondent must demonstrate business necessity "by objective
evidence." This addition, apparently, responds to the debate between the plurality and Justice White with respect to the type of evidence the defendant should produce when the defendant has the burden of proof in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1990); see
supra notes 205-65 and accompanying text (discussing Price Waterhouse); see also H.R. 4000,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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what, prior to Wards Cove, was considered plaintiff's case.35 1
The proposed bills then require the respondent to "demonstrate"
that such practice or group of practices are "required by business
necessity" (proposed section 703(k)(1)(A) and (B)). These provisions make clear that both the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of proving the evidence, persuading the fact finder that
the evidence of business necessity is true, have shifted to the defendant. This shift is consistent with the litigation principles described above that shift the burden of proof to the defendant after
plaintiffs have proved their case with compelling evidence, not with
mandatory conclusions based on presumptions.3 5 2 In a disparateimpact case the plaintiff must, as the proposed bills provide, prove
that a disparate-impact results from an employment practice or
practices. A rebuttable presumption, however, is not part of this
proof. In addition, the bills speak in terms of an "unlawful employment practice," which is the same phraseology and structure used in
other subsections of section 703.3 53 The bills permit a plaintiff to
demonstrate that a "group of employment practices" resulted in a
disparate-impact, (proposed section 703k(1)(B)), changing Wards
Cove's insistence that a plaintiff identify a particular employment
practice. 35 4 The words "results in" a disparate-impact make explicit
what has always been viewed as part of plaintiff's disparate-impact
case, that the plaintiff must prove that the disparate-impact was the
result of the employment practice or practices, not simply that there
is an imbalance in the work force.3 5 5 The structure of the sections
describing an unlawful employment practice take into account Justices White's and O'Connor's apparent concern in Price Waterhouse
that an employer not be labeled as a "violator" prematurely.3 5 6
Under the proposed statute, if the employer can prove the defense,
not only is there no liability, but also there is no label of unlawful
employment practice and therefore no violation. An unlawful employment practice can be determined only after it is determined
whether the employer has proved a business necessity (proposed
sections 703(k)(1)(A) and (B)). Finally, the phraseology of the employer's defense, "business necessity," which is defined as "essential
351. See supra note 350 (describing bills).
352. See supra notes 17-54 and accompanying text (describing principles of litigation); see
also supra note 350 (discussing bills).
353. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
354. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124-25 (1989). That issue is
not addressed or analyzed in this Article.
355. Id. at 2123 (discussing quality of statistical evidence necessary to prove disparateimpact). That issue is not addressed or analyzed in this Article.
356. See supra note 255 and accompanying text (noting Justice White's and Justice
O'Connor's seeming reluctance to stigmatize defendant prematurely).
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to effective job performance" (proposed section 701(o)) restores
3 57
that defense which was weakened by Wards Cove.
Shifting the burden of proving business necessity to the defendant is also consistent with the result in Price Waterhouse, which, like
disparate-impact cases, is not a presumptive case.3 5 8 In Price
Waterhouse, the Court held that when a plaintiff has produced evidence from which a court can infer factually, not as a matter of presumption, that there was substantial or motivating discrimination in
the employment decision, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the discrimination did not cause the employment decision.3 5 9 It should follow that in a disparate-impact case,
when a plaintiff proves disparate-impact by direct or inferential evidence rather than by a presumption, then the defendant should
prove its defense of business necessity.
CONCLUSION

As Part I of this Article demonstrated, the terms "prima facie
case," "presumption, ....affirmative defense," and "burden of
proof" are all labels for the function of allocating the production or
proof of facts between the plaintiff and the defendant. "Prima facie
case" appears three times during the course of a litigation, at the
pleading stage, the production of evidence stage, and the proof
stage, creating a higher degree of burden for the plaintiff at each
stage. The factors used to determine what is the plaintiff's prima
facie case to be pleaded and produced, whether there is a presumption, and whether the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case to require the defendant to prove an affirmative defense all rest on
policy, convenience, fairness, and probability.
In the course of litigation the plaintiff will initially have the burden of pleading, then producing, and finally proving plaintiff's
prima facie case. If the plaintiff uses a presumption, depending on
the jurisdiction, the defendant might then have the burden of proof,
but more typically, the defendant will just have to produce admissible evidence to rebut and burst the plaintiff's presumption. The
plaintiff will retain the burden of proving his or her case. The defendant will have the burden of pleading, producing, and proving
affirmative defenses. The defendant's burdens with respect to af357. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2126. The strength of the business necessity defense is not
analyzed in this Article.

358. See supra notes 275-97 and accompanying text (discussing why Price Waterhouse is not
presumptive case).
359.

Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1779.
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firmative defenses will arise after the plaintiff has met whatever has
been determined to be part of the plaintiff's burden.
Because burdens are allocated based on policy, fairness, convenience, and probability, the Title VII discrimination cases, whether
disparate-impact or disparate-treatment, should consider those factors in allocating burdens. Once it is determined what the plaintiff
should be required to prove, if the plaintiff proves those facts by
direct or inferential evidence, then the burden of persuasion should
shift to the defendant. If the plaintiff proves its case only through
the use of a judicially mandated presumption, then the defendant's
burden is one of production only, not persuasion.
The disparate-treatment cases have correctly determined that
only the burden of production shifts to the defendant if the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case by a presumption. If, however, the
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence, either direct or inferential, from which a fact finder can conclude, as a matter of fact, that
the employer relied on or was motivated in part by discrimination in
making an adverse employment decision, then the burden of persuasion should shift to the defendant.
As disparate-impact cases are based on facts or factual inferences,
once the plaintiff has proved its case, the burden of persuasion
should shift to the defendant. The most recent disparate-impact
case that requires the plaintiff, as part of the plaintiff's case, to
prove lack of a business justification for an employment practice, in
addition to proving that the practice caused disproportionate impact, is inconvenient, unfair, and unnecessary. The Civil Rights Act
of 1990 is therefore necessary to restore basic litigation principles to
the allocation of burden of proof in disparate-impact cases so that
once the plaintiff proves that disparate-impact resulted from an employment practice or practices, the defendant must prove the business necessity of that which caused the impact.

